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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the political process of the EU-directive Solvency II, as well as the 
amending directive of Omnibus II. Solvency II is the new regulatory regime of the European 
insurance industry which is to take effect on the 1
st
 of January 2016. The result of this 
implementation is that life and non-life insurers across the EU will be sharing a common 
regulatory framework for the first time in history.  
 
Since 2001, EU regulation in the realm of financial services has been conducted under the 
legislative „Lamfalussy process‟ which consists of a four level structure. The first step in the 
process tracing study is to give a theoretical account of this system including the ways in 
which it was changed following the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The description of this process 
also necessitates a presentation of the relevant institutions at the EU level of which CEIOPS 
and EIOPA are of particular importance.  
   
Furthermore, the involvement and interests of other involved actors are presented. The 
interests of the Member States have varied significantly as a consequence of differences in 
domestic insurance markets. The non-governmental stakeholders which were involved in the 
process – represented by the insurance industry - are identified and accounted for as well.  
 
The Solvency II process is traced through the following six distinct phases: 
1999-2004 Solvency II – Learning phase: Preparations for the process 
2004-2008 Solvency II – Development phase: Consultations and expert advice 
2008-2009 Solvency II – The political phase: Co-decision procedure and trialogue  
2009-2011 The Financial crisis and the Lisbon Treaty: Significant external “shocks” 
2011-2012 Omnibus II – Pre-trialogue process: Adaptation to the Lisbon Treaty 
2012-2016 Omnibus II – Trialogue process: Long-term guarantee issues and trialogue 
 
The analysis of these stages is conducted from three separate perspectives, namely i) the 
knowledge-based perspective of epistemic communities; ii) the state-centric framework of 
liberal intergovernmentalism; and iii) the theory of multilevel governance. None of the 
frameworks applied provide a reasonable explanation for every part of the directive during all 
six phases. Yet, each has explanatory power for some part of the legislation during some 
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periods of the process. As might be expected, the development phase is best explained by the 
knowledge based approach whereas the trialogues resemble the bargaining between nation 
states predicted by liberal intergovernmentalism. Furthermore, evidence to support the MLG 
theory is to some extent identified throughout the process, particularly due to the heavy 
involvement of private insurance companies as providers of expert advice and as lobbyists.   
 
The period of the Financial crisis and the Lisbon Treaty appears as a breaking point in the 
process after which the explanatory power of all three theories changed as follows:  
- Epistemic communities: EIOPA which (it is argued) resembles an epistemic community, 
was set up as a powerful and (semi-)independent EU agency. 
- Liberal intergovernmentalism: For many European Member States the financial crisis 
implied more pressing, and diverging, national interests which raised the stakes of the 
political process. Hence, the relevance of this perspective was increased.   
- Multilevel-Governance: following the Lisbon treaty, the European Parliament gained 
increased powers and EIOPA was created. Hence, the independent influence of sovereign 
EU actors was enhanced. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Risk and uncertainty are inherent parts of all human activity. From the dawn of time, people 
have spent a great deal of effort attempting to limit the likelihood and consequences of 
external factors that may aggravate, or end, the lives of themselves or their loved ones. The 
various measures taken span through all kinds of inventions and precautions: From the 
construction of city walls and the development of stable sources of food supply in ancient 
times, to the medical vaccinations and financial derivatives of the present day. In other 
words, as expressed by Peter Bernstein (1998, p. ix), “the subject matter [of risk] is daunting. 
Risk touches on the most profound aspects of psychology, mathematics, statistics and 
history”. Risk, and attempts to reduce it, is everywhere around us.  
 
All risk-mitigating initiatives mentioned above have the common motivation of making life 
and property less vulnerable. However, the most significant type of insurance applied by 
human beings is probably not any material artifact as much as it is other humans. Having 
children – or more broadly, making friends and allies - has probably been the most common 
strategy to ensure a safe and comfortable livelihood during the human lifespan. In the 20
th
 
century, this form of inter-human insurance was, in part, replaced by complex institutions. 
One example is the democratic welfare state system that has been a particular characteristic 
of many European societies following World War II. Another example, and the topic of this 
study, is the private insurance industry.  
 
The historical roots of insurance activities are often traced to Chinese merchants who 
diversified by splitting their cargo between several ships around 3000 BC; or to guaranteed 
shipping loans in the Babylonian empire around 1800 BC. Most likely, there are many such 
historic examples from around the world, but the formalized operations of the business 
originated with the signing of the first insurance contract in Genoa, Italy, in 1347. The 
modern industry then really began developing in London, following the great city fire in 
1666, and with the establishment of the first insurance company – Lloyd‟s – in 1688. Since 
then, insurance has grown into one of the major businesses of the modern world. In 2012, the 
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European insurance industry employed about one million people and the written premium
1
 
was close to €1.1tr (Insurance Europe, 2014b).  
 
For most customers, the services of the insurer are usually called upon as a consequence of an 
unfortunate incident affecting the life of the policy holder. Thus, for many clients, the 
relationship with their insurance company is characterized by low activity, if any. Yet, in 
developed societies, almost all inhabitants are customers of the industry, relying on the 
insurer to provide safety against economic loss or ruin. People are beneficiaries of the 
stability and safety which the industry brings about; enabling them to relax and/or take on 
more risks than they otherwise would, knowing that financial losses will be covered in the 
event of property or bodily damage. Furthermore, the insurance industry also affects society 
in another subtle, yet equally important way: (life) insurance companies are generally among 
the institutions in the world with most investments in financial assets. In 2011, European 
insurers had investment portfolios which amount to about €7.5tr (Insurance Europe, 2013b, p. 
34). Hence, insurers are important investors and lenders for firms and governments in need of 
funding. 
 
Thus, the importance of the insurance industry for the general development and stability of 
society can hardly be exaggerated. It should come as no surprise then, and we shall return to 
the reasons why in chapter 2, that the insurance companies of the developed world are also 
highly regulated. In Europe, the industry has been regulated through minimum prudential 
standards known as Solvency I, since the 1970s (van der Ende, Ayadi, & O'Brien, 2006, p. 
61). However, as will be argued in the subsequent chapter, this framework was long ago 
deemed unfit for regulation of such an important industry in the 21
st
 century and it is finally 
about to be replaced by a new, extensive and controversial regulatory regime: the EU 
directive of Solvency II. The development of this new directive – as well as amendments to it 
in the subsequent directive Omnibus II – has been an ongoing EU legislation process for over 
a decade that is finally set to take effect from the 1
st
 of January 2016.  
 
Solvency II will have, and has already had, a significant impact on European insurance and 
capital markets, and thus implicitly for the lives of hundreds of millions of people. Hence, 
                                                 
1
 Written premiums are the amount of money charged by the insurance company for a policy that has already 
become effective.  
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there are important empirical reasons why studying Solvency II is necessary. New 
phenomena carrying such far reaching implications are almost by definition interesting topics 
of study. Furthermore, the Solvency II case is also useful for testing the merit of theoretical 
frameworks of policy processes and in order to make contingent generalizations on European 
legislation and integration. In sum, studying this case is both interesting for its own sake and 
as a means of providing empirical feedback to theories.   
 
In order to do so, however, the topic and the research design first needs further specification. 
The implications of Solvency II could easily be the topic of study in a variety of subjects, 
such as economics or finance. However, as Bjerke (2007, p. 3) wrote in his Master‟s thesis on 
the Basel II Accord, “as a student of politics, I am […] more interested in how an economic 
policy is made, than its consequences”. This is also the spirit of this thesis. Methodologically 
and in terms of theories applied, I will pursue a path similar to that of Bjerke. The subject of 
investigation, however, is moved from banking to insurance with the purpose of investigating 
the following:  
 
Is the political process of the Solvency II directive best explained by expert 
knowledge; Member State interests; or by sectoral interests?   
 
The question above is operationalized in terms of three hypotheses that can be interpreted in 
light of more or less compatible theoretical frameworks all of which relate to how EU 
legislation is conducted. In particular, these hypotheses are as follows:  
 
The process and outcome of the Solvency II/Omnibus II legislation has been dominated 
by: 
H1. epistemic communities seeking to achieve an optimal regulatory regime from 
a knowledge-based perspective. This hypothesis is related to the theoretical 
framework of epistemic communities, associated with Haas (1992) and Davis 
Cross (2013). If this hypothesis holds merit, it will imply that the Solvency II 
process has been developed according to the knowledge perspective. That is, it 
has mainly been produced by experts who are seeking to create an optimal 
regulatory regime which is devoid of special interests. 
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H2. the interests, power and bargaining of the nation states.  
 This hypothesis is related to the theoretical framework of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, associated with Moravsick & Schimmelfennig (2009).  
If this hypothesis holds merit, it will imply that the Solvency II process has 
been developed according to the traditional state-centric interest perspective, 
that is by Member State executives seeking to influence the regulatory regime 
in accordance with the interests of their country. 
 
H3. a multitude of institutions and stakeholders with different interests.  
This hypothesis is related to the theoretical framework of Multilevel 
Governance, associated with (Trnski, 2005) and (Peters & Pierre, 2009). If this 
hypothesis holds merit, it will imply that the Solvency II process has been 
influenced directly either by non-state actors or by supranational institutions 
(at the EU level) operating independently of the Member States.  
 
 
Most likely, reality is found to resemble some combination of these hypothetical 
explanations, but in order to examine the extent to which they hold explanatory power it is 
necessary to conduct a process tracing exercise. Through the process tracing, more concrete 
questions are to be explored such as:  
 Who have been the crucial participants and stakeholders?  
 What interests were these actors pursuing?  
 Which forums were most important for decision making?   
 Which topics were the most critical during the political process?  
 What was the outcome of the discussions on the most controversial topics? 
 
The aim of this paper is to answer these questions, and thereby shed light on the hypotheses 
outlined above. Ultimately, this will lead to some conclusions and generalizations on the 
paramount question. 
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This paper is organized in the following manner: In chapter 2, the insurance industry and 
regulation of this business is outlined in general whereas chapter 3 gives an introduction to 
the Solency II regulations and its consequences. This sets the background stage for the case 
that is under investigation. In chapter 4, the theoretical frameworks that were referred to 
above are outlined in detail. In chapter 5, the methodology of the study is presented. The 
analysis is conducted as a case study, applying the process tracing method and the data is 
acquired through semi-structured elite-interviews. The reasons for, and implications of, these 
choices are further elaborated in this chapter. The process tracing investigation starts in 
chapter 6 which contains a presentation of the theoretical political process, as well as the 
participants and stakeholders involved. In chapter 7, the empirical political process – in 
particular the key conjunctures - are examined. Chapter 8 brings the pieces together by 
discussing the process in terms of the theoretical frameworks: is Solvency II a knowledge-
based directive (epistemic community); a bargained directive (Liberal 
intergovernmentalism); or a plural directive (Multilevel Governance)? 
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2 The Field of Insurance 
 
Although the insurance industry is well known to the average citizen of most developed 
countries, the complexities and variations of the insurance business model – let alone the 
motivations for regulating the industry - are not straightforward. The aim of this paper is not 
to give a textbook account of insurance theory. However, the directive, and the political 
process, of Solvency II can hardly be understood without some familiarity with the industry 
that is to be regulated. Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to providing such fundamental 
knowledge through a discussion of the insurance business model. Next, we turn to why the 
insurance industry needs to be regulated in the first place and thus also define the aims of the 
Solvency II directive. The final section gives an outline of the reasons why pan-European 
regulation is beneficial in this case.  
2.1 The Insurance Business Model 
For companies in most industries, the operational risks of their daily production activities are 
usually regarded as unfortunate side effects of the activities required to provide their 
customers with goods and services. For the financial sector, in particular banks and insurance 
companies, risk is more than just a negative side effect. In these industries, the business 
model is risk (de Weert, 2011). The general idea is to charge the customer a fixed or floating 
– controllable – fee, and in return to take over a particular risk to which the customer is 
exposed. For insurers, the payment is usually obtained from the customer in advance, and 
repaid only if the life- or property-insurance risk were to materialize. That is, the risk that the 
customer will put forth valid claims due to damage on life or property, or, in the case of 
pension products, that the customers live in retirement (i.e. entitled to pension benefits) for 
several decades.  
 
The insurance industry is divided in two parts by legal requirement: The life insurance 
industry and the non-life
2
 industry. In general, the former offers insurance that will prevent 
the customer from living without income for significant parts of their lives (due to bad health 
                                                 
2
 Also known as Property & Casualty or general insurance.   
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or during retirement). The latter offers compensation for damage to (or caused by) cars, 
property, home content etc
3
.  
 
One distinction between the industries is that non-life generally pays compensation as a lump 
sum. Life insurers, on the other hand, more commonly offer products through which the 
customer may receive installments for extensive periods of time. However, what is perhaps 
the most important difference between the two types of insurance business is the average 
length of risks. In the non-life industry claims are usually settled within a few years. The life 
insurance business, by contrast, is characterized by products with long lasting risk exposures. 
This means that it may take several decades before the complete claim of a policy – and thus 
the profitability of a particular customer – is known. For example, a life-insurance transaction 
for a pension product may last from the first premium payment of the customer during his 
first working year until the customer dies and stops receiving retirement compensation at an 
old age. As an illustration, note a typical cash flow profile (i.e. the expected future liabilities) 
of a typical life insurance undertaking: 
 
 
Figure 1: Cash flow profile of a typical (German) life insurer: Expected share of payments to current 
customers in future years. BaFin (2013, pp. 43-44). 
 
The significant time span between the present day premium payment from the customer and 
the future disbursement of funds from the insurer to the customer has some very important 
implications. In particular, it holds clues as to why regulation of the insurance industry is 
necessary. To understand this, consider the following question: with expected claims still in 
                                                 
3
 See (CEIOPS, 2009b, pp. 6-8) for an overview of all lines of business (LoB) in Solvency II. 
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the future, how should the insurer treat the income gained from premium payments already 
obtained? Aside from covering operational costs, there are essentially two options. One 
option is to regard the income as financial surplus and thus pay the obtained premium, less 
operational costs, to the shareholders (owners) as dividend. Clearly, regarding all paid 
premium as income is in essence equivalent to an assumption that there will be no future 
claims (e.g. that none of those saving for retirement will live past the retirement day to 
receive pensions). Surely, no rational customer would want to purchase insurance from a 
company that was making such assumptions. In fact, this is no more than a theoretical 
possibility resembling fraud rather than insurance. It is clear then that for an insurer to be able 
to cover future expected claims, only a limited share of the aggregate premium income 
received from the customers, in any given year, may be regarded as profit. Thus, the second 
option, which is to set aside a significant share of (or all) the paid premium as reserves
4
, is 
the choice made by all serious insurance companies. Reserving is a fundamental activity in 
insurance and it is the key competence area of the mandatory actuarial function.  
 
Hence, for an insurer to underestimate the frequency and size of future claims would be 
reckless, and sooner or later lead to bankruptcy and inability to honor the commitments 
which the customers have already paid for. However, the risk that the claims will surpass the 
premium paid by the customer, not only depends on whether the insurer sets aside sufficient 
reserves. It also depends on how those reserves are handled by the insurer in the years and 
decades that may pass by prior to the payment of compensation to the customer. Indeed, the 
importance of the latter matter – market risk - increases with the time span of the insurance 
contract, so that for life insurers in particular this is a crucial question. Several options are 
open to the insurer as to how the premium funds – the assets under management – are to be 
invested. The options are usually between different classes of financial assets, each of which 
is associated with a unique trade-off between risk and return.  
 
                                                 
4
 Also called Provisions 
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Figure 2: Simplified illustration of risk & return expectations for selected asset classes 
 
As the table above demonstrates, equities (shares) are generally regarded as risky in the sense 
that the value of any given asset may decline a lot over a short period of time. However, the 
flip side of the coin is that this asset class is also associated with a high expected return over 
the long run. Investment-grade bonds
5
 and interest rate assets, on the other hand, are 
generally regarded as safe and stable, but the corresponding expected return is low. Hence, to 
clarify with an example, an insurer could set aside a sufficient amount of reserves to cover 
the future claims, but in turn invest the funds in equities and risk losing a significant share of 
the provisions in the event of a stock market crash.   
 
Clearly, for the customer, there is not necessarily any guarantee that he will receive the 
compensation he is entitled to after having paid the insurance premium in the past. Why then 
is insurance purchased voluntarily, in large amounts, by people all over the world? It appears 
safe to infer from this that insurance companies are not regarded by the general public as 
reckless risk takers. People expect that they will receive a pension from their employer‟s life 
insurance vendor. They expect to receive compensation if their house burns to the ground. 
Part of the answer, in the terminology of game theory, is that the insurance business is a 
dynamic game. Any insurer selecting to regard all premiums as income would soon obtain a 
very sketchy reputation. Hence, any strategy by a company to ignore the future claims in 
exchange for profit would surely be a very short-sighted one. Through competition, the 
                                                 
5
 Rating no lower than BBB from any of the three rating agencies; Moody‟s, S&P and Fitch 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
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players of the insurance markets are competing to offer the lowest price, relative to quality. 
For insurance customers, quality consists to a great extent of the trust that can be placed in 
the insurance provider when it comes to the latter being able to cover its liabilities.  
 
Given that the incentives of insurers to honor their commitments to their customers are 
generally amplified by the dynamic and competitive forces of the market place, one might 
ask why regulation of the insurance industry is necessary. After all, it is the individual 
insurance company that holds the expertise and, presumably, knows the portfolio and 
company risks better than any outsider. However, as will be argued in the next section, the 
nature of the unregulated insurance market is such that the reasons for government 
intervention in this industry are persuasive.  
  
2.2 Insurance Regulation: The Aim of Solvency II 
According to the de Larosiére report on financial regulation in the EU (2009, p. 13), 
regulation is “the set of rules and standards that govern financial institutions”. Any kind of 
such regulation undeniably implies costs: The regulatory rules have to be constructed and 
decided. Time and money - that otherwise could have been applied to profit generating 
activities - must be spent by the insurer in order to understand and implement the regulatory 
regime. The latter may well force the company to make sub-optimal or irrelevant decisions 
from a business perspective, as industry regulations to some extent will be general and, 
almost by definition, not tailor-made for any particular company. Last but not least, the 
regulation must be monitored and any potential implementation failures by the companies 
need to be associated with some sort of costly sanctions. Given these costs that are associated 
with regulation of the insurance industry, a strong rationale for doing so in the first place is 
required. In other words, it is necessary to establish what the aim of Solvency II is and why 
the unregulated insurance market (without either Solvency I or II) is not desirable. This 
section thus provides an essential basis for the analysis that will lead to an answer to the 
overarching question.  
 
Traditionally, the case for regulation of an economic industry is based on market failure, 
which means that the unregulated market leads to an outcome that is not Pareto-optimal. A 
11 
 
Pareto-optimal state, namely a situation in which no one can be better off without at least one 
other market participant being worse off, is a desirable situation which is reached in the 
theoretical, unregulated market. Making such an outcome come about is often the purpose of 
government regulation of firms and industries.   
 
In contrast with the traditional textbook example of market regulation, the Solvency II regime 
is not so much about making the insurance market function optimally, as it is about other 
objectives. One such objective is the harmonization of legislation in order to avoid regulatory 
arbitrage. For example, since the insurance industry is closely linked with the banking 
sector
6
, it is important that legislation is consistent between these industries (Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance, 2014 [Interview]). Second, a core regulatory aim in insurance is to 
avoide the costly knock-on effects of insurers going bankrupt.  
 
Bankruptcy is a necessary and crucial part of the capitalist economic system. However, in the 
case of the unregulated insurance industry, such incidents may often affect the lives of the 
unprofessional creditors – namely the customers – to such an extent that they experience 
great financial difficulty and even poverty. With some contracts lasting for several decades 
(as discussed above), the market mechanism works too slowly to apply the necessary 
constraints on the (life) insurance industry.  
 
It can be assumed that most people would consider it unacceptable that sick or elderly 
citizens, who were unfit for work, were forced to live in poverty because their insurer had 
failed to set aside sufficient reserves. Most likely, the political pressure for social benefits 
would increase. In particular, for a society with a significant welfare state, the burden induced 
by a failing group of insurance companies would soon appear as an externality
7
 as it was 
shifted to the innocent tax payer. For this reason in particular, it should come as no surprise 
that governments want to control the insurance industry and avoid insufficiencies in pricing, 
reserving and general risk management. 
 
In sum, it is clear that the main regulatory aim of Solvency II is to avoid bankruptcies by 
enforcing risk management and capital requirements on the insurance companies. This is to 
                                                 
6
 Often banks offer insurance products and vice versa 
7
 Costs or benefits that affects a third-party that did not choose to incur that cost or benefit 
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be achieved by ensuring that every insurer maintains a level of capital which corresponds to 
the risk exposure of the company. In insurance, as in banking and related financial sectors, 
the regulatory aim is focused on anti-bankruptcy as a result of the potentially vast economic 
and political consequences that follow when large financial institutions break down.  
 
2.3 European Insurance Regulation 
 
Although the case for regulation of insurance markets in general is a strong one, this does not 
necessarily explain why the regulation should be pan-European. Thus, the reasons why this is 
desirable are examined in the first subsection. Next, the current, non-harmonized, regulatory 
regime of the European insurance industry (Solvency I) is outlined, elaborating the most 
commonly identified flaws of this set of regulations. Lastly, we investigate how the new 
regime (Solvency II) is designed with the purpose of resolving these „flaws‟. 
 
2.3.1 Rationale for European Wide Regulations  
The European Union and the European Economic Area (EEA) currently consists of 31 
independent states, each of which is characterized by a unique national economy, social 
security system and insurance market. In order to supervise and regulate these markets, in 
every country there is also an independent and sovereign national insurance regulator. The 
implication is that the insurance markets in the EEA are regulated in 31 different ways. There 
may well be advantages to such a system in which decentralized regulators, aware of the 
culture and local characteristics of their domain, define the rules of the game in their 
homeland. However, as in any process of European integration, whatever these advantages of 
national regulation may be, they are supposedly matched by those of the pan-European 
regulatory regime.  
 
In a paper on European securities regulation, Yannis Averinos (2003) discusses several 
rationales for a single European regulator that applies to the insurance market as well. Firstly, 
there are arguments relating to the efficiency and the quality of the regulator. Regulation is a 
service which implies significant fixed costs. The initial costs of setting it up is high, but once 
13 
 
a law or a regulatory framework has been created, it may be repeatedly used by an unlimited 
number of users. Thus, as the market grows in size, the expenditures of regulation and 
supervision do not increase proportionally. This implies that a single and centralized 
regulator may perform its role much more efficiently than what may be expected from 31 
regulators each supervising a specific share of the total market. Furthermore, according to 
Averinos (2003, pp. 28-29), “Any existence of multiple supervisory agencies and different 
regulatory regimes entails the possibility that powerful interest groups may impede any 
national or cooperative supranational developments”. In other words, it is reasonable to 
assume that a larger supervisor, relative to the companies, is more likely to be able to resist 
regulatory capture
8
. Particularly, this may be an issue in countries that are hosts to large 
insurance groups, especially if the national economy as a whole is dependent on the decisions 
made and the general performance of this insurance company. Another example could be 
domestic companies that are favored in competition with branches of foreign companies 
operating in the same country. In order to avoid such unfortunate biases, a centralized 
European regulator – disengaged from any single national economic interest – may certainly 
be beneficial.   
 
Secondly, a single European regulator is a necessity in order to maintain the same regulatory 
framework, i.e. a level playing field. Identical rules across Europe are highly beneficial for 
insurers operating in multiple countries. For example, costs required to understand and 
implement the rules of every national regulator are avoided, thus providing incentives to enter 
new national markets. In turn, these benefits affect the insurers as well, as more markets 
entrants imply – ceteris paribus - increased competition and reduced prices. Furthermore, 
insurance customers moving from one European country to another can feel confident that 
the regulatory regime maintains the same standard in both nations.  
 
Thirdly, the lack of cross-border financial supervision was identified as a key flaw in the 
financial system which made the European regulatory regime unable to respond efficiently to 
the financial crisis in 2008-9 (de Larosiére, 2009, pp. 10-11). As the global economy, 
including the European market, becomes increasingly defined by globalization and 
                                                 
8
 Regulatory capture happens when a regulatory agency, formed to act in the public's interest, eventually acts in 
ways that benefit the industry it is supposed to be regulating, rather than the public (Investopedia, Investopedia, 
2014). 
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commercial intercourse, it is evident that economic crises are rarely confined to a specific 
country. Rather, the causes and consequences are bound to be international, thus highlighting 
the need for cross-border cooperation in regulation and supervision. In particular, there is a 
great need for regulation of groups operating in different countries; with the purpose of 
ensuring that group-wide risks are not overlooked as such large multinational groups make up 
a significant share of the European insurance market. In addition, a pan-European regulator 
should be able to acquire information, and develop skills, that surpass that of any smaller and 
less informed national supervisor (Everson, 2012, p. 9).  
 
Lastly, a common regulatory framework will most likely induce economic interdependence 
as the complexities that come with cross-border operations are reduced. Hence, the 
development of a European regulatory regime is also a movement towards further European 
integration and the common market. Hence, it can be argued that pan-European insurance 
regulation is also an indirect contribution to the declared aims of the European Union which 
includes peace, security and free and fair trade (European Union, 2014). In other words, 
Solvency II is a project much in the tradition of creating a unified Europe by abandoning the 
many national variations that exist under the current regulatory regime.  
2.3.2 Solvency I 
Solvency I is the regulatory regime of the European insurance industry currently in operation. 
However, this framework was neither consistently planned nor developed in the manner of 
the current Solvency II process. In fact, even though Solvency I consists of 14 directives from 
the 1970s, it was only in 2002 that it was adapted into a uniform directive (Wood, 2004). The 
opinion that Solvency I is inadequate as a regulatory regime is widely shared among the top-
level stakeholders of the European insurance industry, such as the interest organization 
Insurance Europe (2007) and by the European Commission (Barnier, 2011). According to 
Insurance Europe, in some cases, the current rules of Solvency I can even conflict with good 
risk management (Insurance Europe, 2007, p. 3). 
 
This consensus exists in spite of the fact that there have been relatively few cases of 
insolvencies and bailouts in the European insurance industry over the past decades, for 
example relative to banks. Part of the explanation for this is that there are no close business 
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links between insurers. Thus, unlike the banking sector, the risk that other insurers were to 
follow if one was in trouble is low. In other words, one can hardly speak of the existence of 
an “insurance system” through which financial stress can spread (Insurance Europe, 2014d, p. 
31). Nonetheless, insurers are certainly at risk of failure as well. For example, in the Sharma 
report, 21 cases of insurance failures, or near failures, between 1997 and 2002 were analyzed 
as a preparation for the Solvency II process (Sharma et.al, 2002, p. 23). Furthermore, there 
were indeed some cases of insolvency during the financial crisis of 2008-09
9
.  
 
Although Solvency I has done a fairly good job of protecting consumers, it does so through 
exorbitant prudence and an “inefficient allocation of capital which prevents insurers from 
taking on more risks” (van Hulle, 2011, p. 179).  Hence, even though the current regulatory 
regime has been able to fulfill its main purpose to a large extent, it has achieved this through 
means that are inefficient and crude as the capital buffer insurers have been required to 
maintain have not corresponded well to the actual risk exposure of the company. In this 
regard, the flaws of the old regime are numerous: First, only insurance risk is taken into 
account when the capital which is the insurer is required to hold is determined. Furthermore, 
even though the question of whether there are sufficient reserves to cover future claims is 
taken into consideration, this is done only in a very simplistic manner and there is no 
distinction between different insurance products. Second, and very important for our purpose, 
the insurance liability exposure is calculated based on book value (historic value) so that 
changes in the market values and the interest rate are not taken into account in the valuation 
process. Third, the question of how these funds are allocated (market risk) is not taken into 
account at all. Thus,  
 
Under existing European rules, volatility and uncertainty in the estimated value of liabilities is 
addressed in a way that often does not reflect the underlying risk. Insurers are obliged to 
include additional, undefined prudence in their valuation of liabilities, coupled with simplistic 
capital requirements (Braun, 2007).  
 
Fourth, Solvency I is meager when it comes to requirements for reporting, risk management 
and forward looking assessments. Finally, the current regime is not harmonized across the 
                                                 
9
 In particular, five Greek insurers were shut down in September 2009 (Tsentas, 2010), and several insurers in 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg – such as AEGON, ING and Fortis were in need of government 
support during the economic downturn (Woolner A. , 2010) 
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EU. Thus, for example, the method for valuation of insurance liabilities or the risks entailed 
with the allocation of capital is treated differently by the individual national regulatory 
authorities, implying that there is not a single European market for insurance (van der Ende, 
Ayadi, & O'Brien, 2006, p. 60).  
 
The implication of these issues is that European consumers and insurance companies miss out 
on the benefits of pan-European regulation listed earlier. Furthermore, although the insurance 
industry has not been blamed for causing the crisis (Barnier, 2011), general financial 
uncertainty has nonetheless increased the pressure on financial institutions in general to 
prepare for future crises. In sum, both for theoretical and empirical reasons, Solvency I – with 
its flaws and inadequacies – is unfit as a regulatory regime of the 21st century. The case for 
developing Solvency II is therefore a strong one. 
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3 Introducing Solvency II 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the development from Solvency I to Solvency II is 
outlined. Second, the content of Solvency II is presented through the simplified, yet 
pragmatic, three pillar system. Third, the consequences of the regime for the insurance 
industry are discussed.  
3.1 Towards a New European Regime 
In a historical perspective the harmonization initiative of the European insurance markets 
stems from June 1988, when the industry was liberalized and cross-border competition 
allowed for (Meek, 2013). During the 1990s, the existing regulatory regime was evaluated 
and deemed unfit for its purpose. Preparations for the new regime were launched by the 
European Commission around year 2000 with the aim to “establish a solvency system that is 
better matched to the true risks of an insurance company” (KPMG, 2002). However, it was 
not until 2004 that the Solvency II process really began, with an “overhaul process for 
insurance regulation; aiming for completion by end-2008” (Meek, 2013).  
 
After five years of development, extensive consultations and delays, the Solvency II directive 
text was finalized and adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council on the 
25th of November 2009 (van Hulle, 2011, p. 177). The adoption implied the most significant 
regulatory initiative ever directed towards the insurance industry, although it was clear that 
many challenges remained when the legislation was to be specified further in the 
implementing measures. At the time, the directive was scheduled to come into force in 
November 2012, but this would turn out to be only one of several exceeded deadlines. 
 
Early on it was clear that alterations would need to be made in the directive text. The 
implementation date was first moved back to January 2014 in the “Short Directive” in July 
2012, but the really significant changes were to be advanced through the Omnibus II (OII) 
directive which was proposed by the Commission in 2011. The OII directive‟s aim was to 
“adapt the Solvency II Directive implementing measures to the new architecture introduced 
in the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the new financial supervision” which included the 
establishment of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
18 
 
(Chairman of EIOPA, 2013). On a more technical level, the OII directive implied some 
significant changes to the Solvency II directive text, and this need was significantly increased 
by the consequences of the financial crisis which changed the conditions for insurers across 
Europe. OII also implied a delay of Solvency II when it was first published.  
 
When Solvency II replaces Solvency I in 2016 it is not entirely accurate to refer to the former 
as “the new regime”. In fact about 35 per cent of the articles are continuances of the past 
regulations that are also part of Solvency I (Kristiansen, 2014, p. 4). Nonetheless, the 
differences that are brought about by Solvency II are vast, as the aim has been to deal with all 
the weaknesses of Solvency I mentioned above. The implication is that the future insurance 
regulations to a greater extent will seek to align capital requirements with the underlying risks 
to which the individual insurer is exposed, so that if risks are to materialize and lead to 
financial losses, the insurer should not so easily go bankrupt. Furthermore, the directive 
demands that insurers have appropriate risk management and reporting systems in place. The 
ultimate aim then, is protection of the insurance customers through better risk, reserving and 
pricing capabilities and hence fewer bankruptcies. This is all in addition to a harmonized 
supervisory approach across the EU, entailing the theoretical benefits of the single regulator 
identified above (Insurance Europe, 2007, p. 11).  
 
The key differences between the current Solvency I regime, and the planned Solvency II 
regulations, can be summarized as follows:  
Topic Solvency I Solvency II 
Valuation of assets and 
liabilities 
 Valued at (historic) book 
value 
 Valued at (current) discounted 
market value 
Capital requirements 
 Calculated as a percentage 
of the insurance liabilities 
 Statistical calculation taking more 
risks into account  
 Standard model or Internal 
model 
Market risk 
 No impact on capital 
requirements 
 Capital requirements depending 
on risk of asset portfolio 
Operational-, counterparty- 
and disaster risk 
 No impact on capital 
requirements 
 Included in capital requirements 
calculation 
Risk management and 
regulatory reporting  
 Limited  Extensive 
Life and non-life insurance 
regulation 
 Separate regulation  Joint regulation 
Insurance liabilities – Level of 
detail 
 Homogeneous: Limited 
variation between lines of 
business 
 Heterogeneous: Risk exposure 
varies with the line of business 
Table 1: Overview of differences between Solvency I and Solvency II 
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3.2 The Three Pillars 
The Solvency II level 1 text consists of 312 articles and seven annexes (Council, 2009). 
However, like Basel II, the directive is usually presented in the more pedagogic form of three 
interconnected pillars that are outlined in this section. 
   
3.2.1 Pillar I – Capital requirements 
Solvency II is a regulatory system that has the company balance sheet as basis for the risk 
and capital evaluation. Simply put, a balance sheet is a snapshot of the financial status of a 
specific company, identifying what the entity owns (assets) as well as what it owes 
(liabilities). The latter is split between debt (held by creditors) and equity (held by the owners 
of the company). A regular insurance balance sheet may be depicted as follows:  
 
 
 Figure 3: Solvency II – typical insurance balance sheet 
 
A basic understanding of the balance sheet is crucial if one is to grasp the political 
discussions of the Solvency II process. First, note that the balance sheet is an equation that 
must always hold: 
(1) Assets = Debt + Own Funds  
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This may be rewritten as:                                 
(2)                                –       
 
Insurers are required to be financially solid and to maintain an own funds
10
 base which is 
proportionate to the risk exposure of the company so that the company does not face 
bankruptcy. This is the result when (2) is negative and may happen for various reasons: 
Either the value of the assets may drop (e.g. if the stock market declines), or the debt may 
increase (e.g. if more houses burn down or if people live for longer than expected). Whether 
an insurer in fact does go bankrupt in such events depends to a great extent on the amount of 
own funds held in the company. The higher the share of own funds, the less liabilities are 
owed relative to the amount of assets. Hence, the capital of a company works like a buffer 
which reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy.  
 
The flip side of the coin, however, is that capital is costly. The owners of the firm prefer to 
hold as little of it as necessary in the company, in order to get the highest return possible. 
However, the levels of capital that the owner regards as acceptable, may well differ from 
what the government regulator (or the enlightened consumer) is comfortable with. As 
discussed above, the failure of an insurer may imply significant externalities in terms of 
poverty. The regulator‟s solution is simple: a „floor‟ above which the insurer needs to 
maintain its level of capital is established. Under Solvency II, there are two such floors 
known as the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and the Minimum Capital Requirement 
(MCR). Essentially, quantifying these figures is the main purpose of Pillar I. This task raises 
several important questions:  
i)   How are the individual elements in the balance sheet to be valued? 
ii) How risky/volatile are the elements that are valued in i)? 
iii) How is the Solvency Capital Requirement to be calibrated in order to reflect this? 
 
Giving complete answers to these questions goes beyond the scope of this essay. However, 
due to its importance for our purpose
11
, the logic of valuing the provisions should be noted. 
According to the methodology of Solvency II, future insurance liabilities are discounted. This 
                                                 
10
 Also called capital 
11
 it was a major part of the political debates. 
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implies that the present value of a future transaction from the insurer to the customer is 
reduced. The discount factor is determined by the relevant risk-free interest rate which 
essentially is a measure for the “time value of money” 12 (KPMG, 2002, p. 90; European 
Commission, 2007b, p. 108).  
 
Hence, if interest rates increase (decrease) then discount factor will increase (decrease) and 
the value of the liabilities owed to insurance customers will decline (increase). Hence if 
interest rates decrease, and the level of assets are assumed to stay fixed, then the own funds in 
the balance sheet must decline in order for equation (1) to hold. However, the SCR formula is 
calculated so that the capital requirements increase if the level of provisions goes up. Thus, 
an increase in insurance liabilities – for example due to lower interest rates – may imply 
significant costs for the insurance company.  
 
Regarding the calculation of the capital requirement, most insurers will calculate the SCR 
based on the modules of the standard formula depicted below: 
 
Figure 4: The Standard formula: The Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) is a calculation based on 
specified risk categories: Market risk, Health insurance risk, Life-insurance risk, Non-life insurance 
risk etc. Each such category is divided further into sub-categories. 
 
                                                 
12
 Simply put, it reflects that people prefer having money and resources earlier rather than later.  
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Each module in this image represents a mathematical model based on pre-set assumptions 
and parameters aiming to calculate the amount of capital that the insurer should expect to lose 
once in 200 years
13
. This model applies to all insurers across the EU, and the standard model 
is thus a one-size-fits-all approach which is generally thought to be conservatively calibrated.  
However, one may still opt for the lengthy and complex optional process of building a tailor-
made internal model for a particular company. In essence, this allows the insurer to determine 
its own capital requirement, as long as the process through which this is calculated is 
approved by the regulator (Gjensidige, 2014 [Interview]). However, this approach is in reality 
reserved for larger insurers, more well-endowed with the analytical resources that are 
required to build such a model.  
 
3.2.2 Pillar II – Risk management and System of governance 
This part of the directive contains new requirements regarding the internal control systems of 
the companies. Every insurance company should have a formalized system of governance, 
meaning that the policies and guidelines of important operational areas are documented, 
approved by the board and utilized in the organization. Furthermore, the insurance companies 
are required to “appropriately implement the following key functions: risk management 
function, compliance function, internal audit function and actuarial function” (EIOPA, 2013). 
These functions ensure that important tasks and activities in the remainder of the organization 
are performed according to the formalized procedures and that the risk exposure is within 
acceptable levels.   
 
In addition, Pillar II also contains requirements for the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment 
(ORSA) process. Under this part of Solvency II, insurers are required to perform a self-
assessment analysis of its risk exposures, risk management system and capital requirement. 
The process is to be performed at least annually, and shall include an evaluation of all the 
risks that the insurer is exposed to, whether or not they are included in the Pillar 1 model. The 
optimal ORSA process is a continuous process through which the insurance company 
                                                 
13
 Level of significance equal to 99.5 % 
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identifies its risk profile and the capital situation of the company, both at present and for the 
next three to five years. Typically, such a process is depicted as follows:   
  
Figure 5: Example of a general ORSA-process 
 
At the end of the ORSA process, an extensive ORSA-report is to be produced and disclosed 
to the regulatory authorities. 
 
3.2.3 Pillar III – External reporting 
The requirements for submission of information to the national authorities are significantly 
increased compared with Solvency I. Under Solvency II, insurers are required to submit three 
types of reports: 
 Quantitative Reporting Templates (QRT): For most companies 30-60 (in some cases 
extensive) QRT‟s shall be submitted to the authorities on a quarterly basis to give 
detailed information on the balance sheet, capital requirements, assets, provisions 
and so on.  
 Solvency and Financial Condition Report (SFCR): This report shall contain essential 
information on the solvency and financial condition of the undertaking and is to be 
disclosed in public for anyone to access (CEIOPS, 2009a). This report most likely is 
to be produced annually.   
Risk strategy 
Identification of 
all risks 
Assessment of all 
risk exposures 
Risk mitigating 
measures 
Own assessment 
of capital 
requirement 
Risk tolerance 
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 Report to Supervisor (RTS): This report will contain all the regularly reported 
information necessary for the purposes of supervision, within a private document 
sent to the supervisory authority (CEIOPS, 2009a). The frequency is likely to be less 
than annually.  
 
The amount of data that are to be reported to the regulator in the QRTs on a quarterly and 
annual basis is a concern, particularly for smaller companies. The scale of the reporting is, 
however, only part of the challenge. Perhaps more demanding is the consistency 
requirements: the data that shall be reported is usually stored in different sources and based 
on complex calculations. However, a successful completion of the QRTs implies that all 
figures are consistent and add up in the final report. In order to handle such requirements, 
expensive and complex IT systems and external assistance is necessary for most insurance 
companies. Thus, achieving compliance with the regulatory framework in this regard 
implicitly puts strict requirements of professionalism and formalization on the insurers.  
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4 Three Theories for Three Hypotheses 
 
In the previous chapters, the fundamentals of the case in question have been accounted for. It 
is thus time to proceed with the “tools” that are to be utilized in the analysis. In this chapter 
the theoretical basis is constructed. In the next, methods and sources of the study are 
presented and discussed.  
 
The social sciences, as opposed to the natural ones, are characterized by the fact that they 
deal with human action. The implication is that the complex reality which is to be understood 
and explained is unfit for the “perfect” experiments of natural science in which the 
hypothesized causal relationship may be isolated from other potential factors. Hence, 
progress in social science rather needs to come about through the continuous, imperfect 
interaction between theory and empiricism.  
 
A theory in political science is an abstraction of a defined, isolated phenomenon or causal 
relationship. The theories are rarely, if ever, completely true or false. Rather, they usually 
reflect on some part of reality and are useful in order to conduct empirical studies which, in 
turn, give feedback on the validity of the theoretical framework. Thus, caution must be 
applied when interpreting theories and their purpose has to be taken into consideration. In 
short, the potential purposes of applying theories in a case study like this may stem either 
from realism or analyticism (Hvidsten, 2014, p. 201). Based on this understanding, the 
following applications of theories are all relevant to some extent for this case study:  
1. Stability: theoretical frameworks ensure a stable context against which the ever 
changing reality may be interpreted (analyticism).   
2. Structure: theoretical frameworks provide the empirical researcher with guidance for 
specific and selected aspects on which to focus attention (analyticism).  
3. Evaluation: theoretical frameworks support the assessment of the consistency 
between assumptions and reality (realism).  
4. Testability: given that the theories are testable, they allow the researcher to assess the 
theoretical validity based on empirical investigations (realism).  
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Thus, a theoretical basis is crucial for any empirical investigation. In this paper, three 
theoretical frameworks – each related to a hypothesis outlined in chapter 1 - are applied and 
will provide the basis for the analysis of the empirical material. Several theoretical 
frameworks may potentially shed light on the question of what drives policy processes and 
outcomes. However, the three frameworks in this case are selected in order to capture the 
most important actors involved, as well as to highlight the distinction between knowledge and 
interests as the driving forces of the political process. The role of the expert is concretized by 
the theory of Epistemic Communities, whereas the approach of Intergovernmentalism 
represents the more traditional interests of the nation state. Lastly, the Multilevel Governance 
perspective focuses on the complexity of various stakeholders that are involved in the EU 
legislative process and evaluates the extent to which they influenced the process, if at all.  
 
In sum, these three theoretical explanations of policy change and their associated hypotheses 
are outlined in the subsequent sections. The aim is to provide a general understanding of each 
perspective, as well as to indicate their relevance in the Solvency II process. This is achieved 
by the operationalization of each of the three hypotheses into six – more easily „testable‟ - 
sub-hypotheses. Furthermore, it is indicated how these hypotheses are to be assessed in 
chapter 8.  
 
4.1 Epistemic communities 
 
In a theoretical, optimal situation, omnipotent and benign experts would create the regulatory 
regime and implement this in all member countries without adverse influence from Member 
States or stakeholders with special interests. This would lead to a framework which induced 
insurance companies to organize themselves in such a way as to maximize the value created 
by the industry as a whole. Obviously, such circumstances are not going to come about in the 
complex reality. Experts are never omnipotent or (completely) without interests or prejudice, 
and proving that this was so would in any case not be possible. In a political process such as 
Solvency II, most of the actors attempting to influence the process will represent special 
interests, whether these origin nationally, in the insurance industry or elsewhere. However, 
this does not mean that certain actors or institutions involved cannot aim to be such 
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knowledgeable and neutral experts. To the extent that such participants exist in a political 
process, they can be of key importance for the development of a successful regime.  
 
The perspective of epistemic communities is based on the view that experts with common 
goals and knowledge impact policy processes. Davis Cross interprets epistemic communities 
as “networks of experts who persuade others of their shared causal beliefs and policy goals 
by virtue of their professional knowledge” (2013, p. 142).  By influencing states and other 
relevant stakeholders, the hypothesis of this theory is that the policy outcomes are shaped by 
information and expert opinions of causal relations, rather than by power struggles and 
interests. This approach is usually traced to Haas (1992) who defines the epistemic 
community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). The epistemic community approach is – in contrast with the 
interest based theory - associated with strive for Pareto-improvement and plays a role of 
policy coordination. According to Adler & Haas (1992, p. 371), epistemic communities 
influence policymaking by creating expectations in an evolutionary process consisting of 
policy innovation, diffusion, selection and persistence.  
 
In order to investigate whether H1, stated in chapter 1, has merit, we first need to examine the 
following sub-hypothesis: 
 
H1.1 Epistemic communities – aiming to create an optimal knowledge-based 
directive - have existed, and are possible to identify, in the Solvency II 
process 
 
If we are to identify such epistemic communities, these communities must be distinguishable 
from other actors. In essence, the task is to identify non-political communities that 
participated in the development process and were uncoupled from special interests. 
Hence, it is necessary to define the characteristics of what is to be regarded as an epistemic 
community. Fortunately, criteria that enable us to do exactly that are already developed by 
Haas (1992, p. 18). In particular, Epistemic Communities vs. other types of groups and 
political actors may be distinguished along four separate dimensions maintaining that 
epistemic communities have: 
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1. Principled beliefs: Share normative beliefs within the relevant issue area. This entails 
a high degree of internal consensus within the group, on which outcomes are desirable, 
and which are not. 
2. Causal beliefs: Share a set of causal beliefs, which define how the members perceive 
links between possible policy alternatives and desired outcomes. 
3. Knowledge base: Professes a shared notion of validity, having internally defined 
criteria for weighing and validating knowledge. 
4. Interests: Share a common policy program. A shared set of practical responses to a 
particular problem. It is around this policy program all activity of the epistemic 
community centers. Members are motivated by the desire to see the policy program 
realized, not by the prospect of private material gains.  
 
Thus, these are the four criteria against which any potential candidate of an epistemic 
community should be evaluated. Once it is established whether or not epistemic communities 
did in fact take part in the Solvency II process, this is clearly not sufficient either to support 
or to falsify H1. Thus, in order to do so, it also needs to be established that:   
 
H1.2 The opinions and recommendations of the identified epistemic 
communities prevailed at important conjunctures of the Solvency II 
process 
 
It is through the investigation of this hypothesis that the methodology of process tracing 
(elaborated in the subsequent chapter) really comes to the aid of the current study. By 
analyzing the normative and causal policy process and thereby understanding how the end 
result came about we may comment on the influence of epistemic communities.  
 
As a next step, it will then be helpful to evaluate whether the conditions of this case are such 
that epistemic communities are likely to be persuasive in general. Davis Cross (2013, p. 144) 
has assembled a set of criteria that may be applied in order to determine whether or not this is 
the case. These conditions, further specified in chapter 8, states that the influence of 
epistemic communities varies depend on: 
i. Scope conditions: Complexity and controversy of the issue at stake 
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ii. Political opportunity structure: Ability to access top decision makers 
iii. Phase in the policy process: The stage which it attempts to influence 
iv. Coalition building: The level of internal coordination and the level of coordination in 
competing groups 
v. Policy field coherence: The extent to which the issues at stake is technical and 
scientific in nature 
 
Once it is established whether it is likely that the epistemic communities defined above have 
had influence, it is time to consider whether they actually influenced the process. First, the 
different stages of the process in which epistemic communities could have an impact, and in 
what way, must be identified. Second, the opinions and recommendations of the epistemic 
community are to be outlined. Third, the activities of the Community is traced, especially at 
important conjunctures of the process. Forth, it is examined whether any epistemic 
community identified under H1.1 did in fact have an impact on the policy outcome, or 
whether there are alternative explanations or solutions. If the latter is in fact the case, then 
there should also be some causal links between the outcomes and the objectives of the 
epistemic community. 
4.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
In the traditional Realist theory of International Relations, the state is interpreted as the 
central actor of international politics. States act in line with their national interests and non-
governmental actors and institutions have a secondary role, if any. What matters is the power 
play between the official representatives of the nation states. Along the same lines, the state 
centric approach of Intergovernmentalism sees the European Council as the core of the EU, 
whereas the other institutions – such as the Commission and the European Parliament – are 
little but coordinators and facilitators for the states, with insignificant ability to influence EU 
policy processes independently (Moravsick & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 68). Thus, in this 
sense, the EU is first and foremost an organizer of negotiations between states that use 
European institutions to achieve their national interests. States are seen as hierarchical 
organizations of which only the top level matters in the EU processes.  
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Originally, the state-centric perspective was mainly developed for the study of international 
security policy, an area in which the aims of survival and enhanced power are common 
interests to all states. However, it is clear that in order to define a state‟s interests – 
particularly in cases where the domestic circumstances and aims vary significantly between 
countries – it is necessary also to look at the internal conditions of the countries involved. A 
challenge for the classic realist approach is that although states surely will have opposing 
interests, it largely ignores how these interests are rooted in domestic preferences or the 
processes that equate them with the national interest.  
 
The framework of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) resolves this concern as it takes into 
consideration that “The fundamental goals of states […] are neither fixed nor uniform: they 
vary among states and within the same state across time and issues according to issue-specific 
societal interdependence and domestic institutions”. Hence, state decision-makers do in fact 
respond to the nested political pressures from stakeholders at the lower domestic levels, but 
these actors at the lower level have neither any direct nor independent influence on European 
Integration (Trnski, 2005, p. 25). Furthermore, this approach is resting on the assumption that 
states are actors and that they are rational in defining preferences, bargaining for agreements 
and shaping institutions (Moravsick & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 68).   
 
If the empirical evidence is to support the Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach – 
hypothesized by H2, the following hypothesis first needs to be assessed: 
 
H2.1 The EU member states have had significantly different interests during 
the Solvency II process 
 
For our purpose, the relevant differences between state preferences should be expected to be 
the areas that Solvency II impact the most, namely the insurance (and pension) industries. 
The interests of any Member State will be dependent on several factors in this regard, such as 
the size, the type and the relative importance of its insurance market to the national economy 
and the population as a whole. Thus, these are the indicators that need to be examined in 
order to evaluate H2.1. The implication is that there is, potentially, a significant overlap 
between industry and national interests in each Member State. 
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Yet, the overlap should not be expected to be complete. Although insurers should benefit 
from having a formalized and prudent regulatory framework, it should also be expected that 
the preference of the customers – and hence the national interests – is on average for insurers 
to be more conservative than the companies would prefer. Furthermore, the national interest 
in relation to Solvency II also goes beyond that of insurance profitability and solidity. For 
example, as noted above, the new regulatory regime will impact capital markets and may 
have significant consequences for the financing of long-term infrastructure projects or for the 
direct borrowing costs of governments. 
 
However, identifying a variation in national interests – whether associated with the national 
insurance industry, the customers (often equivalent to most of the general population) or the 
national capital markets - does not necessarily mean that these were decisive in shaping the 
Solvency II process. Hence, in order to examine H2, the following sub-hypothesis is required 
as well:  
 
H2.2 These diverging interests have been decisive in shaping the policy process 
of Solvency II 
 
According to the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, domestic governments will accept 
European integration only to the extent that it is in its national interest to do so. Thus, the 
political bargains rest on the lowest common denominator of the participating Member States 
(Trnski, 2005, p. 25). Furthermore, Moravcsik argues that:  
 
EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. 
These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic 
interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of states stemming from 
asymmetrical interdependence (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18). 
 
Since the political process of Solvency II may be interpreted as a special case of EU 
integration, this must also be true here if the LI perspective is to have explanatory power.  
Hence, if the evidence is to support H2.2, it is necessary to identify the cases in which 
Member States – based on national interests – arguably opposed and prevented the 
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harmonized and knowledge-based regulatory framework from being realized. To the extent 
that such examples are not found, it will weaken the LI argument.  
In order to assess the process accordingly, it is necessary to build on the findings in the 
examination of H2.1, before analyzing the process in the following step-by-step manner:  
1. Identify the different ways in which the Member States could impact the process 
2. Identify the concrete conjunctures and issues that were influenced by the Member 
States 
3. Assess the link between the objectives of the Member State and the outcome. 
Consider the extent to which equifinality is present
14
. 
 
This is the underlying approach applied in the analysis of chapter 8. 
4.3 Multilevel Governance 
Whereas the traditional study of international relations has focused on the national interests 
of the states, the third theory identifies multiple actors and arenas of influence in the EU 
(Peters & Pierre, 2009, p. 95).  Thus, the processes of EU politics are seen as equivalent to 
that of a nation state with a complex interplay of actors involved, rather than as an 
international organization without independent influence.  
 
A key point of multilevel governance (MLG), relative to the intergovernmental perspective, 
is that it disputes the assumption of the nation state as the sole type of institution that matter 
at the EU level. According to MLG, states “no longer monopolizes European level policy 
making or the aggregation of domestic interests” (Trnski, 2005, p. 26). The national interests 
and powers of the Member States still matter, but these interests are no longer treated as a 
“black box”. Instead this approach emphasis the direct influence of non-governmental 
stakeholders such as corporations and lobbyists as well. These actors are brought into play in 
the EU process either through formal participation or informal lobbyism. In addition, such 
actors may well be transnational entities that break the barriers of the national interests. The 
theory is concretized in the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
14
 The alternative paths through which the outcome of interest might have occurred (Checkel, 2008, s. 185). 
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H3.1 Non-governmental stakeholders – other than epistemic communities – 
have participated in, and influenced, the Solvency II process 
The obvious starting point is to identify the actors involved and it is clear that the focus in 
this regard will be on the stakeholders which were formally involved in the process. Many 
stakeholders and interest organizations have participated through informal channels, but it 
goes beyond the present study to identify, let alone analyze, all such groups that may have 
had some involvement or influence during the Solvency II process. Thus, the focus will be on 
fewer, but more prominent stakeholders.  
 
Once these actors and interests are identified, it must be determined whether they influenced 
the process. In other to do so, they most likely held some kind of “important resources, such 
as information, political power or expertise” (Trnski, 2005, p. 24) which enabled them to 
have a direct impact on the EU process. According to Bjerke (2007, p. 81), There are 
essentially two ways through which independent stakeholders may impact the legislative 
process: Information and capture. The former implies that the stakeholders are involved 
solely to provide the regulators with information on the industry that is to be regulated. The 
latter rather refers to the case in which the regulated industry is able to impact the regulator 
such that the latter starts to identify the interest of society with whatever are the interests of 
the industry.  
 
Hence, both of these channels are to be examined in order to determine whether the 
stakeholders involved actually had an impact on the process. In the event that they did, it 
should be expected that the role as suppliers of information will make the actor in question 
resemble (or at least replace the need for) an epistemic community. If the impact instead was 
of the nature of regulatory capture, it would imply that the directive has been influenced by 
special interests of non-state actors.  
 
The challenge is that there is no easy way to distinguish between the two. Bjerke (2007, p. 
82) suggests – as a proxy – to investigate whether involvement of interest groups was 
strongest in issues with high uncertainty (which indicates that the involvement of the 
stakeholder is to provide information), or by contrast, in issue areas with high distributional 
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consequences (indicates that the involvement is motivated by capture ambitions). 
Furthermore, Bjerke notes that  
 
The best indication of capture in the policy process is if we could identify a part of the final 
accord which benefits a transnational interest group involved in the policy process, which is 
inconsistent with the policy program of the epistemic community, and which could not be 
explained as a concession to national preferences as those identified under the [Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist] perspective (Bjerke, 2007, p. 83). 
 
Thus, although admittedly an imperfect measure, this is the approach that is to be applied in 
the current study as well.  
 
The MLG perspective does, however, add another feature to the analysis. The top-level 
government is still seen as the main protagonist of national interests, but so does the 
supranational institutions of the EU. Naturally, the EU institutions are vital to any legislative 
and political process in the European Union. However, if the EU institutions are to be 
something more than mere facilitators of Member State bargaining, and independently impact 
the process, there must be some factors that induce them to do so. Of course the Member 
States will have some rational interest in paying the price of some lost sovereignty and 
national competence, in order to gain in other areas (Trnski, 2005, p. 25). In particular, those 
gains may for example be the ones identified in 2.1.3, and this would still be in line with the 
LI perspective. However, according to the MLG view, sovereignty is transferred from the 
Member States to the EU institutions beyond what could be explained by rational and self-
interested state executives. To explore whether evidence for this perspective is found in the 
case in question, we need to investigate the following hypothesis.  
 
H3.2 The supranational EU institutions were independent actors in the 
Solvency II process, and affected the outcome 
Trnski (2005, p. 27) lists several reasons why Member State power could be transferred to the 
EU institutions. First, the fact that the EU presently consists of so many countries makes it 
harder for any single (or group of) Member State(s) to control the process and the EU 
institutions. This is especially important as the ability by the Member States to use veto 
power is low and in decline. Second, the EU bodies have developed significant information 
advantages and networks that go beyond most, if not all, of the Member States. Third, it is 
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not possible for the state representatives to forecast precisely the effects of their collective 
actions. To this latter point, it should be added that these interests may certainly change, or 
short-sighted politicians may discount the long-term future interests of the nation.  
 
These factors may all potentially shed light on the extent to which the EU institutions that 
have been involved in the Solvency II process have been able to act independently and affect 
the outcome in spite of the interests of some Member States. In order to assess hypothesis 
H3.2, we are thus to evaluate, for all relevant EU institutions, whether the end result differs 
from what would have been the case if EU institutions were mere facilitators of Member 
State bargaining.    
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5 Methodology 
 
In this chapter, the choice of method and the way it has been conducted is presented and 
analyzed. The data sources applied are presented and discussed as well.  
5.1 Process Tracing Case Study 
A study of Solvency II could have been conducted from many different points of view and by 
applying a range of different methods, but the need for a detailed examination of the topic at 
hand makes the case study a natural choice. The case study is able to accommodate complex 
causal relations such as equifinality, complex interactions effects, and path dependency 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 22). All issues are highly relevant in the context of a case of EU 
legislative development which essentially is an attempt to make actors with different agendas 
contribute to merging a significant number of different systems – each with its own history – 
into one.  
 
This case study may be categorized as theory guided within Levy‟s typology (2008, p. 4), 
implying that the purpose first and foremost is to explain the Solvency II process. However, 
although answering this question is the main purpose, the ambition of this study is also to 
make some generalizations beyond this particular case. That is, a study of Solvency II is also 
a study of European integration and the institutions, processes and power relations between 
the most important state and non-state actors. According to Lund‟s account of the validity 
system of Cook & Campbell; “strong external validity (generalizations) is achieved if the 
causal relationship may be generalized with certainty to, or over, relevant individuals, 
situations or time periods” (Lund, 2002, p. 107). Although case studies are rarely associated 
with high external validity, George & Bennett (2005, p. 110) point out that such studies may 
instead be limited its ambition to contingent generalizations. This is certainly valid for the 
present study.  
 
Although the Solvency II-process deals with a concrete and (in some ways) rather narrow 
field, there are still several related areas to which contingent generalizations may be drawn. 
Firstly, the Solvency II process is an example of how legislative and political processes in the 
EU works and how decisions are made. Thus, this case can potentially provide generalizable 
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knowledge on the power structures in the EU, and also when it comes to the cooperation both 
between the EU institutions internally, as well as between the EU institutions and external 
actors.  
 
At the same time, the threats to external validity that are usually identified in case studies are 
also present in this project. Firstly, it must be taken into account that the process has lasted 
for many years during which it has been shaped and affected by unique historical incidents 
such as the financial crisis. Most likely, as we shall see, the progress and direction of the 
process would have been substantially different if the economic crisis in Europe had not 
taken place. In some ways, this kind of a “shock” to the process is advantageous as it may 
serve as a quasi-experiment, but it also creates mess as it becomes less clear whether the 
events prior to the crisis are still valid for future generalization. Secondly, the number of 
comparable cases may be limited if this is to extend only to directives of related industries 
with similarly vast implications as that of Solvency II. Hence, although the Solvency II 
process may be interpreted as a special case of European integration, it should be stressed that 
the generalizations drawn are contingent and thus must be interpreted and applied to other 
cases with care.  
 
Within the genre of case study research, there are various ways in which such a project may 
be conducted. When investigating causal chains and conducting analyses of complex 
decision-making processes, George and Bennett (2005, p. 173) argue that the method of 
process tracing is advantageous because “multiple types of evidence are employed for the 
verification of a single inference”. According to these authors, process tracing is defined as a 
method in which the researcher 
 
Examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see 
whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the 
sequences and values of the intervening variables in that case. The process tracing method 
attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – 
between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable (George & 
Bennett, 2005, p. 766). 
 
The goal of process tracing is “to obtain information about well-defined and specific events 
and processes” (Tansey, 2007, p. 765). At face value, this method is indeed very suitable for 
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a case study of Solvency II, but this is not to say that applying such a method is without 
challenges. As Tansey (2007) points out, process tracing requires a significant amount of 
data, a necessity which is unrealistic to fulfill adequately in a project with limited resources. 
Second, it is questionable whether the relevant information is even made public, especially 
given the fact that Solvency II is yet to be implemented. Finally, a key challenge pointed out 
by Bjerke (2007, p. 35) is that alternative explanations to the causal chain of events identified 
will have to be eliminated (equifinality). In a complex and prolonged case such a Solvency II, 
in which thousands of people have been involved, this is certainly a valid criticism of the 
process tracing method.  
 
In spite of these challenges, the process tracing method still stands out as the appropriate one 
in this case. This is also the conclusion reached by Bjerke (2007, p. 79) who explains that 
“process tracing implies that the relevant actors and stakeholders are identified, and that their 
preferences as well as their influence on the process are mapped and identified at the critical 
phases”. Hence, the same approach is selected for this paper as well.  
 
In the following chapters, the key actors and stakeholders of the Solvency II process are 
identified and their interests and activities outlined. In chapter 6, the actors and their roles in 
the model of legislative development are outlined. Furthermore, the country variations of the 
national insurance markets in Europe are analyzed in order to understand the interests of 
these and other actors. In chapter 7 the process of development and bargaining in the 
Solvency II and Omnibus II processes are traced from one phase to the next. Key issues, 
disagreements and outcomes are identified. In chapter 8, this material is discussed in order to 
assess each hypothesis specified in chapter 4.  Once this is achieved, the overarching question 
specified in chapter 1 is answered through an assessment – inspired by quasi-experimental 
design - of the explanatory power for each of the three theoretical perspectives. In the end 
some contingent generalizations are provided.  
 
The choice of process-tracing case study methodology implies that the Solvency II process is 
to be examined in detail as a single event, rather than being compared with some, or many, 
other cases in an empirical or statistical study. Yet, this decision does not necessarily dictate 
the method for data acquisition. Thus, this question is to be dealt with next.  
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5.2 Data Sources 
 
What is the most appropriate method of data generation in a process tracing study? According 
to Tansey, “interviewing, and especially elite interviewing, is highly relevant” (2007, p. 766). 
In the case of Solvency II, there are several reasons to follow this advice. First, the amount of 
available information is massive, and the content is often complex. Finding the critical facts 
under such circumstances is challenging and increases the value of advice and opinions from 
experts who are able to identify what matters. This is especially important to the extent that 
useful information may not be public. Second, interviews enable the researcher to access 
informal affiliations or decision making arenas. During the Solvency II process, important 
decisions have perhaps also been made in unofficial forums that are not known to the public. 
In general, interviews also allow the interviewees to communicate considerations and 
nuances that are not necessarily possible to grasp by studying documents. For these reasons, 
it was decided to perform the present study partly by conducting semi-structured elite 
interviews.  
 
A key challenge, given this choice, is of course to locate and obtain interviews with the most 
appropriate experts. Tansey argues that “random sampling runs against the logic of the 
process tracing method, as it risks excluding important respondents from the sample purely 
by chance” (2007, p. 765). Thus, scholars seeking to conduct interviews for such studies 
should rather attempt to find experts with the appropriate knowledge, rather than aiming to 
draw a random sample of potential interviewees. Various sampling strategies may be applied 
in order to select such experts and, in this case, a combination of purposive and snowball 
sampling has been selected. Whereas the former strategy implies that the researcher selects 
interviewees based on his own knowledge of potential experts, the latter utilized the expert 
knowledge in the sampling as they are asked to suggest other respondents. Although there is a 
risk that interviewees will suggest people who share their opinions to a great extent, this has 
been a necessary sampling strategy for this case. 
 
Elite interviews imply that the data collection has been carried out as “conversations 
regarding a limited number of open questions” (Berry, 2002). Clearly, this style of 
interviewing is not without flaws. In particular, it relies heavily upon the subjective 
knowledge and interpretations of the source, which may be highly dependent on the parts of 
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the process in which the interviewee has been involved, as well as on the interests the person 
concerned has represented. Furthermore, there may be significant time lags between the 
participation and the date of the interview. Thus, these disadvantages must be kept in mind 
when interpreting reasoning that is based on such interviews. 
 
During this project, three interviews – with a total of four interviewees – have been 
conducted representing The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Finanstilsynet), the 
Ministry of Finance (Finansdepartementet) as well as Gjensidige, the largest non-life insurer 
in Norway - representing the industry. The respondents of Finanstilsynet and 
Finansdepartementet have all been directly involved in some part of the SII or OII process, 
whereas the representative of Gjensidige has extensive experience from implementation of 
the regulatory requirements in the insurance company. Ideally, more interviews should have 
been conducted and a clear limitation to this study is that no first-hand interview has been 
conducted with EU employees or representatives of the life insurance industry. 
 
In addition to these interviews that have been conducted in person, a great variety of sources 
have been utilized. However, to the knowledge of this author, the past research on the 
political process of Solvency II is limited in the field of political science. There are numerous 
sources discussing the technical content of the directive, but the process through which this 
regulation was developed does only appears to be documented and analyzed to some extent in 
outdated papers such as van der Ende et.al. (2006) and Eling et.al. (2007). Notable exceptions 
are indeed represented by Sandström (2011, pp. 575-666), which provides a comprehensive 
overview of the Solvency II process up until 2010, and by van Hulle (2011) who explains the 
consequences of the financial crisis and Lisbon Treaty to Solvency II. However, no source 
appears to present a comprehensive political analysis of the complete Solvency II process 
including the consequences of Omnibus II. Admittedly, this is not puzzling as the latter 
process is still ongoing at the time of writing.  
 
Because of the novelty of the topic under investigation, many of the sources utilized in this 
study – particularly for the Omnibus II process – consists of news articles and second hand 
interviews with high-level politicians, bureaucrats and industry representatives with 
significant involvement in the Solvency II and Omnibus II processes. The main provider of 
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these have been the websites www.risk.net
15
 and www.solvencyiiwire.com which are both 
among the most professional and persistent providers of news on Solvency II. However, in 
spite of this fact, the use of such sources should come with a caveat as they cannot be 
expected to be of the same quality as, for example, articles in scientific journals. This is not 
ideal for the validity of any study. However, in order to alleviate this concern a significant 
number of sources have been utilized so that the main facts presented in this paper are - to the 
extent possible and unless otherwise is stated - cross checked with different sources.    
Other noteworthy sources have included letters from industry representatives and politicians, 
meeting minutes from discussions in specific EU institutions, as well as impact studies 
conducted during the process.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 Registration is required to access articles 
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6 Solvency II: Process, Participants and Interests 
The first step in a process tracing analysis is to identify the key participants and stakeholders 
involved. The political process of Solvency II (and Omnibus II) have been initiated, driven 
and is going to be finalized by the institutions of the European Union. Hence, it is difficult to 
understand the political process of Solvency II without first grasping the roles of the EU 
institutions involved and how they have interacted. Next, it is also necessary to investigate 
the interests of the EU Member States and the insurance industry.  
6.1 Solvency II in the European Union 
For our purpose, examining the political process of Solvency II, it suffices to confine focus to 
the European Parliament (EP), the Council of Ministers (the Council) and the European 
Commission (the Commission)
16
. Thus, an account of how these institutions have been 
involved in Solvency II is given in the first section. Furthermore, several committees and 
other specialized EU organizations – such as EIOPA - have had a critical role in the Solvency 
II process. The most important ones are presented in the second subsection. In the final two 
subsections, the legislative Lamfalussy process, as well as how this process was altered as a 
consequence of the Lisbon Treaty, is explained.  
6.1.1 The European Union  
The Commission is organized in 28 departments known as Directorates-General (DG) that 
are each dedicated to a specified policy area. In the case of Solvency II, the relevant DG has 
been the Internal Market and Services (DG MARKT), headed by the Commissioner Michel 
Barnier. The DG MARKT is further divided in separate Directorates, such as Directorate H – 
Financial Institutions. The Commission‟s work on Solvency II and Omnibus II has mainly 
been conducted in unit H5 (Insurance and Pensions) of this Directorate. During most of the 
Solvency II process, the unit was led by Karel van Hulle (who also led the Solvency II 
trialogue), until he was replaced in January 2013 by Klaus Wiedner. Thus, it is the latter that 
has been in charge during the final stages of the Omnibus II process. The DG MARKT has 
arguably been the key engine in the legislative development of Solvency II.  
                                                 
16
 The reader is assumed to be familiar with the general role, purpose and organization of these institutions. For 
a comprehensive presentation see e.g. (Bomberg, Corbett, & Peterson, 2012, pp. 47-73). 
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The Council is made up by ten configurations. For the purpose of Solvency II, the relevant 
one has been the configuration Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) that is composed 
of national ministers on economics and finance. It is the ECOFIN which ultimately adopts the 
Council‟s version of a legislative act, but it does so only after discussing it with the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The COREPER is split between 
COREPER I and II. The former is made up of permanent representatives dealing with 
technical matters, whereas the COREPER II consists of the Member States‟ ambassadors to 
the EU and is chaired by the Member State which currently holds the presidency of the 
Council. The COREPER is both a forum for dialogue and discussion between the Member 
States, as well as a source of political control and guidance for the expert groups that are 
working on draft legislation (European Union, COREPER).  
 
The Council also exercise executive powers by controlling the Commission through the 
„comitology‟17 system (Hix, 1999). According to Hix (p. 21), the Council and the 
Commission‟s division of labor as executives of the EU government may sometimes lead to 
deadlocks, but the comitology system is one of the mechanisms which are in place in order to 
avoid such deadlocks. The comitology system is a set of committees, designed by the 
Council, through which national experts issue opinions on the implementating measures 
proposed by the Commission. Thus, the comitology system enables the governments to 
scrutinize the Commission. The system consists of five different procedures, and there is a 
negative relationship between the autonomy of the Commission and number of the 
procedures since the Commission has to consult the relevant committee of national experts 
that is related to the specific procedures.  In the case of Solvency II, the Regulatory 
committee was the relevant procedure, which implied that the Commission could “enact the 
measures only if the [comitology] committee supports the measures by Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV), otherwise the matter is referred to the Council (Hix, 1999, pp. 41-43). 
 
In general, there are several reasons for the delegation of governing responsibilities from the 
Council to the Commission. The Commission is independent in the sense that the positions of 
                                                 
17
 As shall be demonstrated, the Lisbon Treaty has (at least to some extent) disrupted the comitology system. 
Yet, accounting for this system is still relevant for our purpose as Solvency II was mainly developed prior to the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
44 
 
its members are not affected by the uncertainty and time-constraints associated with political 
elections. This allows the Commission to be (more) neutral regarding national or sectorial 
interests, and it enables the institution to deal with legislation of complex, technical matters 
(Hix, 1999, pp. 50-52). In addition, the exercise of executive powers by the Commission and 
the Council is scrutinized by the European Parliament. 
 
In the European Parliament, the legislative work to draw up, amend or adopt proposals is 
conducted by the 20 standing committees. In general, the committee members have an 
important agenda-setting role in preparing legislation for debate in the Parliament (Pollack, 
2009, p. 130). As described above, the EP receives legislative proposals from the 
Commission, and these are assigned – by the EP president – to the committee responsible in 
the relevant policy area to present a report on the proposal to the plenary. The committee 
responsible appoints a rapporteur who is to write the report on its behalf (Sandström, 2011, p. 
627). For the Solvency II process, the committee of Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) 
appointed Peter Skinner as its first rapporteur, whereas the committee of legal affairs (JURI) 
also appointed a rapporteur, namely Sharon Bowles, both of whom published their draft 
amendments to the Final directive of Solvency II in 2008.  
 
6.1.2 EU Insurance Agencies 
In 2003, the Commission established two insurance committees that were to be engaged in 
matters of insurance regulation. The newcomers were the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Committee (EIOPC) and The Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisor (CEIOPS) (MARKT, 2003). Whereas EIOPC was to be a 
regulatory committee, replacing the former Insurance Committee, CEIOPS replaced the 
former Insurance Conference as a supervisory committee (Sandström, 2011, pp. 575, 576, 
590). Both committees were established following the European Parliament‟s endorsement of 
the four-level Lamfalussy process for development of EU banking and insurance regulation 
(examined in the subsequent section).  
 
From the beginning of the Solvency II process, EIOPC was set to have a key role in the 
legislative development. EIOPC was set up as a Comitology committee in order to assist the 
45 
 
Commission in adopting implementing measures (essentially operationalizations of the 
directive) (COD 2003/0263). This is the forum in which Commission aimed to keep the 
technical discussions, such as provisions and the target capital level, in the development 
process of Solvency II, (Sandström, 2011, p. 609). It was set up as a committee of regulators 
consisting of national ministers of finance, or regulatory authorities from the Member States, 
which were to meet at regular intervals as well as “whenever the situation demands” 
(European Commission, 2014b).  
CEIOPS was established by the Commission and consisted (at the end of the SII process) of 
15 high-level representatives from insurance and pensions supervisory authorities of EU 
states. The purpose of this establishment was to remove the most technical negotiations of the 
legislative development away from the discussions in the Commission during the 
development process of the legislation. In fact, the Commission was required to consult 
CEIOPS before adopting new measures (Weber-Rey, 2011a, p. 4). In addition, the committee 
worked to define supervisory policies, as well as to converge supervisory rules and practices 
through the college of supervisors
18
 (de Larosiére, 2009, p. 52).  
Throughout the development of the Solvency II directive, the involvement of CEIOPS was 
significant. In particular, the Committee prepared its advice for the Commission by first 
consulting the market participants through working groups and transparent public 
consultations (Sandström, 2011, p. 578). Furthermore, CEIOPS was responsible for the 
dialogue and relations with insurance undertakings as well as the supervisory authorities 
(Sandström, 2011, p. 609), however in cases, on which agreement in CEIOPS was not 
possible, the matter would be handled by EIOPC (Sandström, 2011, p. 611).  
The importance of EIOPC and CEIOPS in the Solvency II process was crucial, but the 
financial crisis provided considerable drive to reform the financial regulatory architecture of 
Europe. This also included a review of the role of these insurance committees. The process of 
reform was formally initiated by Mr. José Manuel Barroso, President of the European 
Commission. In November 2008, he established an expert committee, tasked with 
formulating a proposal for a new supervisory architecture for European financial markets and 
institutions. The committee, chaired by Mr. Jacques de Larosière, published its final report in 
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 Multilateral supervisory groups that are responsible for the supervision of multinational financial institutions 
(EIOPA, 2014b). 
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February 2009 (the „de Larosière Report‟). It recommended the establishment of an EU-level 
body, mandated to oversee risk in the financial system as a whole, as well as the replacement 
of the Commission advisory bodies (including CEIOPS) with EU agencies (de Larosiére, 
2009, p. 47).   
The result – materializing from the beginning of 2011 - was the creation of the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), which included Micro- and Macro-prudential 
supervision and consisted of three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) representing 
banking, securities and insurance. The ESA for insurance, which replaced CEIOPS (as well 
as equivalent banking and securities committees) was a new supervisor of insurance 
regulation in the European Union: The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) (Regulation 1094/2010). The establishment of EIOPA was clearly in line 
with de Larosiére report and it symbolized a new era in European insurance supervision. 
Whereas CEIOPS had been a small committee offering non-binding advice for the 
Commission, EIOPA was to be an independent and institutionalized advisor to the Council 
and the Parliament, as well as the Commission. Furthermore, EIOPA was created in order to 
further cross border insurance regulation and supervision in the European Union, protect and 
rebuild trust in the financial system, as well as to ensure consistency in the regulation of the 
insurance industry.  
EIOPA is composed of various committees in which representatives of the national 
supervisory authorities participate, whereas political representative ministers are not 
involved. The committees are responsible for writing draft legislations that are presented to 
the Board of Supervisors, which is the main decision-making body of EIOPA, consisting of 
leaders and representatives from the national supervisory authorities (EIOPA, 2014a).  
The creation of EIOPA (and the other ESAs) is an important event in the process of European 
integration. Indeed, the introduction of agencies with such significant rule-making and 
supervisory capabilities “mark them out as some of the most powerful institutions ever 
established at the EU level” (Everson, 2012, p. 17). The fact that this “technocratization” 
takes place in the financial industries should not come as a surprise given the intuitive 
argument that complex technical areas should be governed by experts rather than politicians 
that are more likely to conflate “market regulation with redistributive macro-economic 
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policies” (Everson, 2012, p. 11).  The problem with this move towards independent 
technocratization is clearly that it implies a move away from democratic legitimacy.  
Yet, this depends on how independent of the other EU institutions EIOPA actually is. On the 
one hand, EIOPA could of course only be created with the permission of the Council and the 
Parliament. It operates under the Commission which retains “final decision making power” 
and the Meroni doctrine – which prohibits the delegation of discretionary power to agencies - 
“continues to preclude the full independence of agencies at EU level. Accordingly, EU 
agencies are only ever „semi-autonomous‟” (Everson, 2012, p. 13). On the other hand, several 
arguments support the claim that EIOPA is in fact an independent actor. First, this is 
supported by the fact that the members of its scientific committees are appointed in open 
competitions based on expertise. Second, it is ensured by the fact that Member State 
agencies, operating within the EU national network are „autonomous‟ of their own 
government. Finally, the fact that the Council and the Parliament in most cases are not bound 
to follow the decisions made by EIOPA, the need for the Member States to introduce politics 
at the agency level is limited (Everson, 2012, pp. 15,26). In sum then, the balanced judgment 
on the autonomy of EIOPA is perhaps that no one controls EIOPA, yet EIOPA is under 
control (Everson, 2012, p. 24).  
6.1.3 The Lamfalussy Process of Solvency II 
The process of legislative development for financial regulation in the European Union was 
significantly altered following the Lamfalussy report and the resulting implementation of the 
formalized Lamfalussy Process in 2001. The stated aim of the new process was that “in the 
future Europeans will be able to rely on a more accountable and efficient regulatory 
structure” (Lamfalussy, 2001, p. 8). This brought the EU regulation of the banking, securities 
and insurance industries “from the national to the supranational level and put in place much 
of the institutional and political foundations necessary for integrated financial markets” 
(Posner, 2007, p. 3). Several directives have been produced according to the rules of this 
process, of which Solvency II is one of the most important examples. According to a review 
of the process by the Commission, the Lamfalussy system has been “a pioneer in introducing 
and strictly applying sound regulatory principles: a bottom-up approach, open consultation, 
impact analysis, early and thorough participation of market professionals and consumer 
bodies plus national regulators” (European Commission, 2007a).  
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However, as part of the Lisbon treaty, the Lamfalussy process was altered so that there are – 
for our purpose - in effect two different frameworks: The pre-Lisbon Lamfalussy process 
(under which the Solvency II directive was partly developed) and the post-Lisbon process in 
effect from the 1
st
 of December 2009 (under which the Omnibus II directive was developed). 
The original, four-level, framework of the Lamfalussy process thus applies to the pre-Lisbon 
process. This is described and illustrated as it was below, whereas the important alterations 
made to this framework - particularly as a result of the establishment of EIOPA - are 
subsequently explained.  
Figure 6: Pre-Lisbon Lamfalussy Process (European Commission, 2007a, p. 14) 
 
The Level 1 – Framework legislation - of the process is the Legislative Act which states the 
enduring principles (and political outcomes) underpinning the solvency system; hence it is a 
“skeleton” text which states the overall direction of the regulatory regime. The level 1 text in 
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the Lamfalussy process is developed according to the following co-decision
19
 procedure in 
the EU.  
The Commission develops the first legislative proposal through a comprehensive consultation 
process with stakeholders that are formally or informally included in the process. In the early 
phases of the (Solvency II) process, experts from all Member States – often representing the 
national FSAs and MoFs participated in drafting groups, as well as in the EIOPC, together 
with Commission experts. In the EIOPC, draft legislation and other matters were discussed, 
and delegations provided advice to the Commission prior to finalization of various drafts and 
proposals. 
The proposal is then passed on for the first reading of the European Parliament which may either 
adopt or amend the text. The text then continues to the Council which may approve or amend the 
proposal from the EP. In the latter case, the Council adopts a Common position which is returned 
to the Parliament for its second reading (the Council may also reach a principal agreement – a 
General approach - before the EP‟s first reading). In turn, the EP may accept or amend the 
Common position, and in the latter case it is returned back to the Council. If the Council does not 
approve the suggested amendments to the Common position, the Conciliation committee is 
convened, the aim of which is to attain agreement on a final joint text (Codecision “Step by 
step”).   
As the deadlines are tight, both to set up the Conciliation Committee following the Council‟s 
second reading and for reaching agreement in the Committee, negotiators usually meet in 
advance of the formal initiation of the process. These informal, ad-hoc discussions are 
usually joined by all three institutional bodies, and are thus known as the “Trialogue” 
(Codecision “Step by step”). During the trialogue negotiations, the national interests are  
pursued much a lot more bluntly relative to the development phase, but the process is much 
less transparent to the general public. According to Sandström (2011, pp. 629-630), this is 
where the real negotiations are taking place and, as we shall see, this has been the case both 
for the Solvency II and the Omnibus II processes.  
 
Thus, for an EU directive to pass and become part of the national law of all member states, 
the Conciliation Committee process must ensure that the Parliament and the Council reach a 
                                                 
19
 The name of the procedure has later been changed to the „ordinary legislative procedure‟.  
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final compromise on the Commission proposal. The Commission, being the originator of the 
legislation, has a mediating role and aims to reconcile the positions of the Parliament and the 
Council, as well as to defend the original content and purpose of the draft legislation.  
 
The level 2 texts are implementing measures specifying the level 1-directive in further 
detail. However, this is an area in which the Lisbon Treaty brought about significant changes. 
Under the original process the Commission was to develop the level 2 text in accordance with 
the Comitology procedure introduced earlier. The aim of this procedure was to improve the 
efficiency of the legislative process. As the Council would find it difficult to reach agreement 
on all aspects of the (non-essential) elements of the legislation, these were delegated to the 
Commission which was given the task of preparing and adopting texts. The responsibility of 
the Commission was to perform this task within the framework that was given by the level 1 
text and, hence, the implication was that the level 2 documents was not required to go 
through the co-decision process described above. 
 
The Commission would develop these measures by first requesting technical advice from 
CEIOPS. Working groups in CEIOPS would draft these texts following frequent consultation 
with the insurance industry as well as public hearings, before returning with 
recommendations to the Commission which finalized the texts (Insurance Europe, 2007, p. 
7).  
 
However, in order to supervise and control the Commission‟s exercise of these powers, 
EIOPC – which comprised of Member State representatives – would vote on the measures 
and was thus able to block the Commission and refer the matter in question to the Council 
(Financial Services Authority, 2011).  Hence, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission 
was able to adopt implementing measures only after consulting EIOPC. However, this 
procedure was subject to a great deal of controversy due to worries in the European 
Parliament who saw EIOPC as a “mini-council” and feared that “the Commission together 
with the Council might unduly interfere with its co-decision powers” (van Hulle, 2011, p. 
187). This was the background for the important modifications introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty to this part of the process. 
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The level 3 of the Lamfalussy process is the supervisory standards that were developed by 
CEIOPS under the original SII process. These texts are guidelines for the implementation of 
the level 1 and 2 texts, which shall enable the national insurance supervisors to apply the 
directive and the implementing measures to the insurance industries in the Member States 
(Insurance Europe, 2007, p. 5).  
 
The fourth level is Enforcement, namely the act of monitoring and ensuring compliance with 
the directive in the member states. This task is performed by the Commission (European 
Commission, p. 12).   
 
For our purpose, it is the level 1, and to a lesser extent level 2, texts that are in scope, as this 
is where the political process has really taken place.  
 
6.1.4 The ‘Lamfalussy Process’ of Omnibus II 
As noted above, the Lamfalussy process described applies to pre-Lisbon directives only, such 
as Solvency II, as the Lisbon Treaty and the financial crisis brought about significant changes 
to financial legislation in the European Union.  One of the main intentions with the Omnibus 
II directive was indeed to adapt the Solvency II directive to these changes.  
Under the new Lisbon procedure of legislative development, the Parliament and the Council 
obtained the right to prescribe which of two procedures were to be used by the Commission 
for adoption of the level 2 acts: delegated acts and implementing acts.  
The delegated acts, following Article 290 of the Lisbon Treaty, apply to non-legislative acts 
that amend or supplement the level 1 directive. The Commission develops these acts through 
consultations with expert committees, namely the new Expert Group on Banking, Payments 
and Insurance (EGBPI) which is composed of experts appointed by the Member States and 
has replaced EIOPC in this regard (European Commission, 2014a). According to a 
respondent from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance – with some experience from 
EIOPC/EGBPI meetings, the work conducted in these forums could be characterized 
primarily as experts seeking to agree on sound legislation based on objective criteria, even 
though there is some bargaining between delegations based on national circumstances and 
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interests as well (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2014 [Interview]).  Following the 
finalization of the draft text by the Commission, the delegated act is sent to the Parliament 
and the Council which may oppose the act, in which case it is to be amended by the 
Commission. If the act is not opposed, it is adopted as drafted by the Commission (Weber-
Rey, 2011a).  
As for the implementing acts, following Article 291 of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission 
seeks advice from EIOPA and then develops the Level 2 text in accordance with the level 1 
directive. Yet, the Commission no longer has to obtain the acceptance of EIOPC, and there is 
no specific role for the Council or the EP to control the Commission‟s exercise of 
implementing powers. This control is instead exercised by the Member States who are 
responsible for the implementation of legally binding acts (van Hulle, 2011, pp. 188-189).  
The Parliament and the Council shall be informed, but have no right to prevent the 
implementing acts from entering into force unless they deviate from the level 1 text.  
In addition to the amendment of the level 2 legislative development process, the Lisbon 
Treaty also brought about enhanced powers for EIOPA. Of particular importance was the fact 
that EIOPA – unlike its predecessor CEIOPS – was given the right to create legally binding 
technical standards. This new level „2.5‟ in the Lamfalussy process requires EIOPA to draft 
Regulatory technical standards (RTS) for the delegated acts, and implementing technical 
standards (ITS) for the implementing acts. Whereas the Parliament and the Council may 
revoked the former, this is not the case for ITS (Weber-Rey, 2011a). However, both of these 
technical standards developed by EIOPA are to specify technical (not politically 
controversial) areas of the regime only. Although this description is confirmed by the 
representative of the Norwegian FSA, this interviewee also adds that it has also been the case 
– particularly during the Omnibus II process – that working groups hosted by EIOPA to some 
extent has been affected by political signals and guidance (FNAN, 2014 [Interview]). The 
scrutiny of the RTS and the ITS has been delegated to the Commission, implying that if it 
opposes the technical standards, the Commission has the “power only to delay its full 
adoption as a regulation or decision, subject to parliamentary and Council scrutiny” (Everson, 
2012, pp. 17-18). 
 
The legal standards at level „2.5‟ will co-exist with the level 2 legislation of the Commission. 
In addition, the powers of EIOPA were strengthened further as the national supervisory 
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authorities from this point were bound to the level 3 legislation on a „comply or explain 
basis‟. Hence, national regulators are required to follow the level 3 legislation unless they 
have a clear explanation for why it should not apply to their domestic market (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, 2012, p. 3). Hence, in essence the establishment of EIOPA implies that 
the national supervisory authorities, according to the former head of the British FSA, became 
arms of an EU policy-setting body (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2012, p. 3). 
Thus, amendments of the Lisbon Treaty as well as the establishment of EIOPA, has altered 
the Lamfalussy process in significant ways. First, since level 2 acts are no longer necessarily 
developed under the Comitology procedure (under which the level 2 committee may refer the 
text to the Council), the European Parliament has gained control over level 2 texts through its 
right to reject delegated acts. Second, the establishment of EIOPA with enhanced rights and 
resources implies that the power and influence of the experts in the supervisory authority is 
increased. Third, since the Parliament and the Council are unable to reject implementing acts, 
and the technical standards developed by EIOPA are supposed to be non-political, the 
delegated acts at level 2 are really the last strictly political stage in the rule-making process. 
Thus, politically controversial legislation may be found, not only in the level 1 text, but in the 
delegated acts as well (Coelho, 2014).  
6.2 Varieties of the European Insurance Industry 
A key aim of the Solvency II project is to harmonize the rules of the European insurance 
industry which varies greatly between countries. However, it is not only the laws that vary 
between the European nations, so does the subject matter that is to be regulated: The 
difference in size, composition and complexity of the national industries in the EU Member 
states are highly significant. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to deal with these national 
variations in much detail, but a fundamental understanding is vital for the analysis of the 
political negotiations.  
 
By intuition, it appears that the biggest insurance markets are to be found in the largest and 
wealthiest nations, that is, the countries in which the Gross Domestic Product is greatest. 
However, it is not possible to predict - based only on the size of a nation‟s economy – what 
size its insurance market will be. Several factors, such as culture, risk environment and 
national regulations also impact the market. In sum, there is a significant variation in the 
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share of EU nations‟ GDP that is spent on insurance products. As the graph below illustrates, 
the Eastern European nations – in addition to generally being the poorest nations of the EU –
also spend a lower share of their national income on such products, relative to the wealthier 
western neighbors. Whereas the insurance market in the United Kingdom amounts to about 
12.9 % of its GDP, the comparable figure for Romania is only 1.2 %. 
  
 
Figure 7: Selected EU Member States: Insurance premium as share of GDP in 2012 (Gross 
Domestic Product). Source: (Insurance Europe, 2014c). 
Hence, the European insurance market is in essence determined by the size of the national 
economies, modified by the proportion of the national income that is spent on insurance. In 
total then, the size of the most significant EU insurance states/regions are depicted as follows, 
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Figure 8: Gross Written Premium: Life and non-life insurance in selected European 
countries and regions 2012
20
 
 
(Insurance Europe, 2014c). 
 
There are several notable facts in these figures. Firstly, it is clear that the life insurance 
industry is of relatively greater importance compared with the non-life industry. Second, in 
the less economically advanced countries of Eastern Europe, the importance of non-life 
insurance is relatively speaking greater compared with most of the western European nations. 
Finally, the data shows that about 80 % of the European life insurance business is written 
either in the United Kingdom, Germany, France or Italy. Since it was established above that 
the greatest challenges of Solvency II have been related to this industry, it should come as no 
surprise that these countries and their biggest companies are key actors in the Solvency II 
process.  
 
However, size is not the only factor distinguishing European insurance markets. The 
variations that are significant between some European countries – also reflect the fact that 
there are differences in the structure of life insurance pension schemes and are not be counted 
for in the data pictured above. For example, in some countries pension funds (not life 
insurance) are important alternatives to the life insurance business (Davis, 2011). These 
differences are often related to the more general welfare state systems and public benefit 
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 Nordics = Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland. 
Eastern Europe = Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia. 
Rest of EU (on which there is data) = Austria, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta. 
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schemes that are specific to each Member State (Gjensidige, 2014 [Interview]). One 
distinction between type of welfare/insurance model which stands out for our purpose is the 
one often found in the mature welfare states of North-Western Europe. The extensive life 
insurance markets of these areas generally have a relatively high share of insurance products 
with guaranteed-benefits through which the insurer has obliged itself to pay the customer a 
fixed annual payment
21
 following illness or retirement (whether for a specified number of 
years or until the death of the customer). Many other parts of Europe have instead welfare 
systems that are more savings-based, implying that the risk resides with the customer, not 
with the insurer (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2014 [Interview]).  
 
Furthermore, the variations of the European insurance industry are not confined to the 
industry itself. It is also reflected in the traditions and capabilities of the national supervisors. 
The European insurance industry is far from homogeneous when it comes to national 
regulation and supervision. As one might expect, the largest companies in the biggest 
insurance markets also in general appear to be better prepared for the Solvency II regulations 
than their peers in smaller and/or less developed markets. According to EIOPA,  
 
there are „huge differences in the preparedness‟ for  Solvency II among European 
national supervisors and  certain authorities will have to undertake a  „fast journey‟ to 
be ready for the implementation of the directive in 2016 (Kristiansen, 2014, p. 17). 
 
In sum, the variation of the European insurance industry is a consequence of many different 
factors such as general historical and cultural specifications, welfare state traditions, general 
macroeconomic development, industry traditions and capitalization, as well as the 
supervisory traditions. Surely, the road to harmonization is far from straightforward, and 
potential country, industry and company interests abound. However, in order for such interest 
to be taken into account in the new legislation, representation and participation in the 
development process is necessary. This is the topic to be explored next.  
 
 
                                                 
21
  A serious issues for insurers is that such historic contracts often assume an annual return significantly above 
current interest rates. 
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6.3 Stakeholder Interests: Participation and Representation 
So far in this chapter, an account has been given of how European financial legislation is 
created through interactions between EU institutions that are directly, or indirectly, 
influenced by the interests of the member states. However, as described above, the Solvency 
II process has also seen significant participation from non-government organizations and it 
was from the start characterized by extensive consultation with stakeholders. In essence, 
these stakeholders may be separated in two, non-exclusive, groups: First, organizations that 
have had a formal role in the Solvency II process. Second, entities that have attempted to 
impact the legislative development through informal lobbying.  
 
Due to the duration and complexity of the Solvency II process, identifying the key actors is a 
task which is not possible to fully cover in a study of this magnitude. Hence, in the following, 
only the actors and stakeholders of the insurance industry, which is arguably have been of 
most significance during the process, are included.  
 
Although the entities most heavily involved in the formal legislative development represented 
the insurance industry itself, single European insurers were usually not directly involved in 
the formal process. As illustrated in the figure below they were instead represented by several 
interest organizations: 
 
 
Figure 9: Formalized role of insurance company interests in the Solvency II drafting process 
(Insurance Europe, 2007, p. 7) 
CEA (Comité Européen des Assurances), which was renamed Insurance Europe in March 
2012, has perhaps been the key non-governmental stakeholder throughout the Solvency II 
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development phase and was arguably the most important representative of the insurance 
industry. Insurance Europe is the interest organization for European insurance companies, 
and has 34 European national insurance associations as members. In turn, these national 
associations represent about 95 % of the total written premium in the European insurance 
industry (Insurance Europe, About us, 2014a). Thus, both large and small companies from all 
parts of the industry were relying on CEA to represent their interests in the development of 
the new framework (Insurance Europe, 2014a). In its own words, the organization works to 
build industry consensus, a task that may certainly be a challenge given the variation which 
exists between European insurance markets.  
Across the EU insurance market, there are over 5,100 companies in operation. Yet, the 
market share is split very unevenly between these companies. In fact, according to a report by 
the interest organization of European insurers, the largest insurers have a combined market 
share close to 85 % even though only about 6 % of the companies are classified as large 
(defined as Gross Written Premium > €1,500m) (CEA [Insurance Europe], 2007). 
Furthermore, the same report states that the 20 largest groups alone account for 
approximately 55 % of the total volume of the industry. These insurance giants are mostly 
based in the largest countries of Western Europe, but they operate abroad - in other EU 
countries or other continents – as well. Furthermore, they usually have interests or ownership 
stakes in other insurance firms, thus resulting in complex group structures with entities 
operating across many different national jurisdiction and regulatory regimes. In addition, 
these large companies also have their own channels of direct participation, namely the CRO 
Forum and the CFO forum, the latter of which represents 20 large European insurers. Both 
groups have been active and formally included in the Solvency II process. 
The challenges of representing a heterogeneous European industry may also manifest itself in 
other ways. One example of this, pointed out by a representative of the Norwegian FSA, 
refers to an incident following a publication in the early phases of the Solvency II process: 
The CEA announced its official opinion on the publication, only to be followed by 
significantly different opinions published by some of the largest national insurance 
organizations (FNAN, 2014 [Interview]). Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the CEA has 
provided the industry with a platform and, as we shall see, has provided advice and support 
during important phases of the project. Furthermore, the CEA has also cooperated with other, 
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more specialized insurance organizations, such as  AISAM/ACME which represent mutual 
insurers and ICISA, whose members are credit insurers.  
The Groupe Consultatif (GC), which changed its name to the Actuarial Association of Europe 
(AAE) in 2014, represents the actuarial profession in Europe. Actuaries are traditionally the 
employees who are in charge of calculating the premiums and reserves of the insurance 
company. Although the GC/AAE is based on voluntary contributions from its members, its 
involvement in the Solvency II process, as we shall see, has been significant and it has been 
one of the main stakeholders in the drafting group of the directive. Although most actuaries 
are employed in the insurance industry, the self-proclaimed aim of the group is “to provide an 
impartial academic viewpoint that is less influenced by political and commercial 
considerations than other individual stakeholders (such as corporates or member states)” 
(Brooks & Murray, 2013, p. 4). Obviously, one should not conclude from this that the 
actuarial interest organization is without interests (making the role of the actuary more 
comprehensive would be an obvious one), but it is still the case that the main role and 
objective of actuaries should be to estimate the provisions for future claims correctly from a 
technical perspective. Hence, relative to profit seeking insurance companies and politicians of 
the Member States, a certain higher degree of neutrality and adherence to the overarching 
principles should be expected from the actuarial organization.   
 
When it comes to the informal contributors and lobbyists in the Solvency II process, it goes 
beyond the scope of this study to give a comprehensive overview of the entities that have 
taken part in the process. In any case, this is certainly a very demanding task given the 
number and variety of more or less formal lobbyists that have attempted to impact the 
process. According to a representative of the Norwegian FSA, Karel van Hulle - who was in 
charge of Solvency II at the Commission between 2004 and 2013 –lobbyists appeared from 
all thinkable interest positions during the process (FNAN, 2014 [Interview]). Such interests 
may of course not be limited to insurance companies. Furthermore, examples of non-
insurance industries that have clear business interests in Solvency II – and have been 
mentioned during the interviews for this study – are investment banks, accounting firms, 
management consultants, as well as IT-software providers. However, the most prominent 
lobbyist – as we shall see - has still been the insurance industry which has made a significant 
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effort to impact the process both by utilizing its formal involvement, as well as through more 
informal channels.   
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7 Tracing the Solvency II Process 
 
In the previous chapter, the theoretical Lamfalussy Process was described and the main 
institutions, states and stakeholders identified as the first step in the process tracing exercise. 
Thus, we now move on to the actual legislative development of Solvency II and Omnibus II, 
and to discuss how the identified actors were involved and influenced the process.  
For pedagogic purposes, the processes of SII and OII can be separated into the following six 
distinct, simplified and chronological phases that shall constitute the steps of the process 
tracing exercise. It must be stressed however, that a different classification of phases could 
have been equally reasonable. 
Years Phase/Process Main topics & activities Notable actors involved  
(non-exhaustive list) 
1999-2004 Solvency II – 
Learning phase  
 Analyses and case studies 
conducted – reports produced 
 Focus on provisions 
European Commission, Insurance 
Committee (predecessor of EIOPC) 
Insurance Conference (predecessor 
of CEIOPS), CEA, Groupe 
Consultatif, National insurance 
supervisors, KPMG 
2004-2008 Solvency II – 
Development 
Phase  
 Calls for advice (1-3) 
 Quantitative Impact Studies  (1-3) 
 Development of the level 1 text 
European Commission, CEIOPS, 
EIOPC, CEA, Groupe Consultatif, 
Member State experts, The 
Insurance industry 
2008-2009 Solvency II – 
The Political 
Phase  
 Quantitative Impact Study (QIS4) 
 Legislative process in the Council 
and the EP 
 Implementing measures 
 Trialogue debate: 
o Group support regime 
o Equity issues 
Trialogue: EP, Council, 
Commission. 
Lobbyists. 
Insurance companies (in the QIS) 
2009-2011 Financial crisis 
and legislative 
change 
 Financial Crisis 
 Lisbon Treaty: Altered Lamfalussy 
process 
 The de Larosiére report 
 Establishment of EIOPA 
EIOPA, Trialogue 
2011-2012 Omnibus II – 
Pre-Trialogue 
process 
 Quantitative Impact Study (QIS5) 
 Development of the OII Directive 
 Legislative process of the EP and 
Council 
EIOPA, Commission, EP, Council,  
Insurance companies (in the QIS) 
2012-2016 Omnibus II – 
trialogue 
process and 
implementation 
 LTGA report:  
 Trialogue debate; 
o LTGA Issues 
o Adjustments to the 
Lamfalussy process 
o Third Country Equivalence 
 Delegated acts & Implementing acts 
EIOPA, trialogue: EP, EC, 
Commission. 
Insurance companies (In the LTGA 
study) 
Table 2: Overview of phases in the Solvency II process 
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7.1 Solvency II – The Learning Phase: 1999-2004 
When the Solvency II directive finally comes into force in 2016, seventeen years will have 
passed since the Commission  agreed to conduct “a more fundamental and wider-ranging 
review of  the overall financial position of an insurance undertaking, including investment 
risk” (MARKT, 1999). In the following four years, several reports were produced in what 
Sandström (2011) describes as “the learning phase” of Solvency II. This was the phase in 
which many studies were carried out, and reports were produced, leading eventually to the 
overall design of the Solvency II system (van der Ende, Ayadi, & O'Brien, 2006, p. 66).  
 
Early on the Insurance Committee (the predecessor of EIOPC) initiated four different projects 
aiming to prepare the ground for the future Solvency system. The four studies resulted in four 
individual reports, each of which were distributed to the Member States as well as to core 
stakeholders such as CEA and Groupe Consultatif. (Sandström, 2011, p. 579). Two studies 
focused on provisions in life- (MARKT, 2002a) and non-life insurance (MARKT, 2002b), 
whereas the recent historical causes of insolvency in the insurance industry were analyzed in 
the Sharma report (2002). In addition, the KPMG report summarized background knowledge 
on the current regulatory regime. It also suggested the application of the three pillar approach 
(already used for banking regulation in the Basel framework) to the regulatory regime for 
insurance (KPMG, 2002, p. 16). Already during this “learning phase” of the process it was 
evident which of these pillars that was to raise most controversy in the years to come:  
 
On most issues, particularly those relating to pillars II and III, there was significant agreement 
between Member States. On quantitative methods, there seems to be support for the general 
approach from most Member States, but different views exist on certain detailed technical 
matters. These will be subject of further analysis and discussion before the draft CEIOPS 
mandates are finalized (MARKT/2530/03, 2003).  
 
 
 
7.2 Solvency II – The Development Phase: 2004-2007 
The development of the Solvency II framework began early in 2004, as the Commission 
started to prepare the main draft framework directive, draft mandates for working areas of 
significant agreement (Pillar II) as well as documents to follow up issues on which there was 
less agreement (Pillar I).  
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The Commission also published a first proposed framework for the solvency system, thereby 
introducing the architecture of Solvency II. The legislative development work reflected the 
Lamfalussy model as the work was divided into separate legislative levels and streams 
(Sandström, 2011, pp. 590-591). Hence, in accordance with the procedures for level 1-3 
documents presented above, both EIOPC and CEIOPS were given important tasks. Whereas 
the former would be make important decisions on the principles of the legislation at level 2, 
the latter were to give technical advice, communicate with stakeholders and develop 
guidelines for supervisors. In order to fulfill its tasks, CEIOPS set up a number of technical 
subgroups, to perform the work related to the SII project. These groups were operational from 
the summer of 2004, and both the CEA and the Groupe Consultatif organized shadow 
working groups in other to be able to cooperate with the groups set up by CEIOPS 
(Sandström, 2011, p. 590).  
At the Insurance Committee‟s (EIOPC) meeting in June 2004, the Commission presented its 
road map for the development of Solvency II (Sandström, 2011, p. 592). The road map aimed 
at completion of the level 1 text by July 2007, whereas the implementing measures were to 
follow in 2008 or 2009 (Sandström, 2011, p. 592). The road map also included extensive 
consultation from the insurance industry and the actuarial profession. A key recommendation 
of the Lamfalussy report was that, during the legislative process, the Commission should “put 
in place a more rigorous consultation and transparency mechanism” (Lamfalussy, 2001, p. 
25). Indeed, hearings are mandatory for legislative development in the EU, and the Solvency 
II process was certainly conducted in line with this requirement. The legislative process has 
thus been public and involved a very significant number of stakeholders that have 
participated in the debate (Insurance Europe, 2007, p. 5). According to one interviewee there 
has been an enormous amount of comments and input from stakeholders throughout the 
process. The main organizations, such as CEA/Insurance Europe, Groupe Consultatif/AAE 
and AMICE have been particularly active in this regard. At times, these organizations have 
also obtained draft documents for consultations that have not been available to other 
stakeholders (FNAN, 2014 [Interview]).  
The participation of stakeholders was ensured by CEIOPS, which was “committed to consult, 
both before and after the drafting of each Consultative paper, stakeholders such as market 
participants, consumers, and end users, in different ways” (Sandström, 2011, p. 639). One of 
the main ways through which CEIOPS brought stakeholders into the process was through 
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“calls for advice” on important legislation and technical matters. These were requests from 
the Commission to CEIOPS, developed based on advice from EIOPC.   In the early phases of 
the legislative process, the Commission issued three such waves of calls for advice for 
CEIOPS that dealt with Pillar II (July 2004), Pillar I (December 2004) and Pillar III 
(February 2005).  Before the calls for advice were issued to CEIOPS stakeholders such as 
Group Consultatif and CEA, were asked to give their comments on the text (Sandström, 
2011, p. 592).  
 
Another way through which the legislative authorities obtained input from the industry was 
by conducting Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) that were to help assess the valuation and 
capital requirement issues in Pillar 1. From the early stages of the process, it was clear that 
such studies, with the purpose of providing “basic reasoning for the major policy decisions 
taken during the Solvency II project as well as to gauge their impact”, was necessary 
(MARKT/2502/05, 2005, p. 5). Since the impact assessments were to contain aspects relevant 
for negotiations in the Council and the Parliament, the focus of the study was to concentrate 
on the major issues, specifically the overall quantitative impact of the new regime 
(Ibid:2005). In total five QIS studies were conducted between 2005 and 2010 (Sandström, 
2011, pp. 640-641, 648). As the graph below illustrates a large portion of European 
companies, from all parts of the industry, took part as the number of participants increased 
significantly in each impact study.  
 
Figure 10: Number of Participants in Solvency II/Omnibus II quantitative impact studies 
(QIS-reports 1-5 and LTGA report).  
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Based on the work performed by the sub-groups, responses to consultations such as the “calls 
for advice” as well as the Quantitative Impact Studies, the Commission developed draft 
proposals of the Final Directive (i.e. the level 1 text of the directive). After postponements, 
the first was produced in July 2007 (Sandström, 2011, pp. 592; 603-608). In line with the co-
decision procedure, the next step was to get approval from the Parliament and the Council as 
the real political negotiations of Solvency II began.  
7.3 Solvency II – The Political Phase: 2007-2009 
The „political phase‟ was initiated with the proposal delivery from the Commission as 
described in the previous chapter. This meant that the EP and the Council were to produce 
their own versions of the level 1 text, before the three parties were to come to agreement in 
the final trialogue.  
7.3.1 Work Streams of the EP and the Council 
The individual work streams of the EP and the Council were both set up after the release of 
the proposed directive text by the Commission. Now both organizations were to assess and 
amend the draft in separate working groups within each institution.   
 
In the EP, the Commission draft was discussed in the ECON and JURI committees, and also 
with stakeholders such as CEA, AMICE, national insurance associations and lobbyists who 
directed their efforts directly towards the rapporteurs and the MEPs (Sandström, 2011, p. 
627). Eventually, there were over 800 proposed amendments to the Commission text, and the 
final report was adopted by the ECON Committee on the 7
th
 of October 2008.  
 
The working group of the Council consisted of many of the same participants that took part in 
the EIOPC during the development phase. According to Sandström (2011, pp. 627-628), 
some of these meetings were for national experts, some for the attachés, whereas some 
meetings included both of these. During the Slovenian presidency in the spring of 2008, 
compromises were reached on most issues, yet two stood out: the group support regime and 
the treatment of equity risk.  
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The Group support regime 
The group support regime (articles 234-247 in the draft directive) had been suggested by the 
UK at an early stage of the Solvency II process and was directed at the large, multinational 
insurance groups of Europe. The idea was that such corporations were to be regarded as one 
company, so that they no longer would need to fulfill the capital requirement (SCR) in each 
local jurisdiction in which they were operating (van Hulle, 2011, p. 181). Thus, multinational 
groups would be allowed to fulfill only the minimum capital requirement (MCR) (not the 
higher requirement of the SCR) in associated subsidiaries in other EU countries, as long as a 
guarantee to transfer capital under stressed conditions was issued by the parent company. The 
group support system would therefore allow large insurance groups to operate with less 
capital in other EU countries relative to local companies. This approach was based on the 
thought that the risk profile of a group should be assessed taking into account that risks might 
be mitigated across companies in different jurisdictions. In other words, the risk that a group 
is exposed to is not equal to the sum of the risk of each solo entity belonging to the group 
(CEA (Insurance Europe), 2008). In addition, the legislative measure also included better 
supervision of such groups as a cross-border authority would be dedicated to the specific 
group.  
 
However, in the heterogeneous European insurance industry which is dominated by rather 
few large insurance groups that are present with branches in many countries, the group 
support suggestion turned out to be controversial. On the one hand, the large insurance 
groups (particularly the UK) would be able to lower their capital requirements and thus 
increase the return on capital from subsidiaries in other jurisdictions. On the other hand, for 
those countries whose national markets  have a strong presence of foreign companies, the 
group support regime caused a worry that they would be reliant on supervisors in larger 
nations, and that capital might not be transferred to subsidiaries (and thus their domestic 
customers) when needed (Clark, 2009).  
 Equity Risk: The Dampener and the Duration Approach 
The equity dampener, which was proposed by the French presidency during the work stream 
of the Council in September 2008, is an adjustment to the equity risk module of the standard 
model. It is a stabilizing mechanism of the capital requirement, which works by taking stock 
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market movements over the past three years into account when calculating the equity risk. 
The purpose of this mechanism is lowered during recessions, so that insurers are not induced 
to sell equities, thus reinforcing economic downturns. According to a representative of the 
Norwegian FSA, this was one of the first really political elements of the Solvency II process 
(FNAN, 2014 [Interview]).   
Another such measure related to equity risk is known as the equity duration approach. This 
reduces the capital requirement of equities by taking into account that the volatility of 
equities is important in the short term, but not expected to be significant in the long run. 
Hence, this measure was introduced by the French presidency in order for the capital charge 
to be reduced by taking into account the long holding period of such assets (Sandström, 2011, 
pp. 628, 813).  
 
 
Outcome 
Van Hulle explains that all of these issues had been controversial prior to the Council 
process. However, it was the initiation of the financial crisis that made them unacceptable. 
Regarding the Group support regime, 
it became impossible to convince particular Member States (those Member States in which 
the subsidiaries are located) that a parent undertaking would be prepared to provide group 
support to a subsidiary when either the parent or the group as a whole would face serious 
financial difficulties (van Hulle, 2011, p. 178). 
 
On the equity duration approach as well “most Member States were opposed to a reduction of 
the capital charge for equity investment as the financial crisis had shown once more how 
quickly equity investments suffer from a fall in financial markets” (van Hulle, 2011, p. 179).  
Given the disagreements on these two particular issues, the COREPER II meeting in the 
beginning of October was unable to reach a final agreement. When the ECOFIN met on 
October 7
th
, it was thus decided to return the draft to the COREPER in order to find a solution 
on both issues (Sandström, 2011, p. 628).  
During the French Presidency, which lasted from July to December 2008, a compromise was 
reached in which the equity dampener and the duration approach were added to the directive. 
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The group support regime, which was opposed by 12 Member States, was removed from the 
legislation proposal of the Council (Sandström, 2011, p. 629). The compromise was sufficient 
to complete the work stream of the Council. Hence, its version of the final directive was 
adopted as a “general approach” by the COREPER II on the 19th of November and finally by 
the ECOFIN on the 2
nd
 of December 2008 (Sandström, 2011, p. 629). 
The Commission was strongly opposed to the text adopted by the Council, and stated that it 
would “not be able to support the presidency compromise” (Bateson, 2009). Furthermore, 
according to one news article on the process, Sharon Bowles, the EP JURI rapporteur, tagged 
the Council-compromise a “dirty deal” in which the presidency exchanged the removal of the 
group support regime (which several of the Eastern European Members did not want) in order 
to include the equity dampener (Woolner A. , 2010). The outcome was also opposed by the 
UK Council representative, who warned that the legislation would set capital requirements 
below the current levels for British insurers (Bateson, 2009). 
7.3.2 Solvency II trialogue  
A year and a half after the finalization of the draft proposal by the Commission, the work 
streams of both the Parliament and the Council were completed at the end of 2008. This 
marked the beginning of the Conciliation procedure: namely the trialogue in which the 
Council, the Parliament and the Commission meet to reach a final compromise for the 
legislation (Sandström, 2011, pp. 626-627). 
In total, eight trialogue meetings – the first on the 22nd of January 2009, the last on the 18th of 
March - were conducted. In addition, it was agreed to set up a technical committee for 
nonpolitical issues, which met and agreed on 96 articles in the directive (Sandström, 2011, 
pp. 629-630). Thus, it is worth noting that a significant number of issues were regarded as 
“non-political” even in the trialogue. 
In the political meetings, on the other hand, several controversial topics were defined, and the 
five that were to be discussed further were agreed at the second meeting. These were 
(Sandström, 2011, p. 630): 
1. The Group support regime 
2. Anticyclical mechanisms (including the equity issues) 
3. Cooperation among supervisors 
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4. Third-country issues 
5. Quality of Own Funds 
 
At the beginning of the trialogue, in December 2008, it was the directive version of the 
Council that stood out from the other two, both regarding the group support regime and the 
equity issues. As described above, this was caused by the fact that the Council wanted to alter 
the draft proposal of the Commission by removing the group support regime and including 
the equity proposal. The Commission and the Parliament, on the other hand, wanted the 
Group support regime, whereas neither had the equity measures included in their versions of 
the directive (Sandström, 2011, p. 629).  
Early on in the trialogue process, the Parliament presented a united front on its version of the 
text and made clear that there would be no discussion on the equity issues unless a 
compromise was first put forth on the group support regime.  (Sandström, 2011, p. 630). 
Initially, the Czech Presidency of the Council did not have much of a mandate to compromise 
with the Parliament, but in order to make progress the former produced a draft compromise 
and obtained such a mandate from the Council Working Group on the 18
th
 of February. 
According to Sandström (2011, p. 630), “This was seen as a major step forward and was a 
thaw in the negotiations”. 
However, the EP‟s answer to this compromise was rejected by the Council Working Group 
with opposition coming in particular from Poland, Spain and Portugal, along with several 
smaller Member States (Sandström, 2011, p. 616). According to Sandström, these countries 
were very successful in standing firm as a blocking minority in the political process. Given 
the opposition the suggested text the “Presidency decided to come up with a new compromise 
proposal in order to break the deadlock” (2011, p. 631).  
 
The new proposal was to remove the group support regime from the final directive, but to 
include a „review clause‟ which 1) calls on the Commission to present, two years after the 
transposition date, a report on the application of the provisions regarding group supervision; 
2) three years after the transposition the Commission shall make an assessment of the benefit 
of enhancing group supervision (Sandström, 2011, p. 633).  
 
70 
 
At the trialogue meeting the 11
th 
of March, the Presidency informed the Parliament and the 
Commission about this solution, which most Member States were willing to accept. As the 
representatives of the Parliament also concurred with the suggested review clause, the group 
support regime was removed from the directive, and in reality postponed. In the next 
meeting, on the 17
th
-18
th
 of March, a compromise was reached that also led to the inclusion 
of the equity dampener. As for the equity duration approach, the compromises introduced this 
measure for some pension products, and, as a notable exception to the general rule of the 
directive, it was made optional for the Member States (van Hulle, 2011, pp. 179, 184 
(footnote)). A final informal agreement was reached on the 26
th
 of March 2009.  
 
In its statement on the completion of the trialogue the Czech Presidency listed as the most 
sensitive issues both the group support regime and the treatment of equity risk (Sandström, 
2011, p. 632). The industry – represented by the CEA – expressed satisfaction with the 
compromise, but noted that the removal of group support from the directive was unfortunate. 
In particular, reference was made to the de Larosiére report which, one month earlier, had 
recommended that “the Solvency 2 directive must be adopted and include a balanced group 
support regime, coupled with sufficient safeguards for host Member States [...]” (de 
Larosiére, 2009, p. 23).   
 
The directive was adopted by the EP on the 22
nd
 of April and by the European Finance 
Ministers at the Council on the 5
th
 of May, shortly before CEIOPS was asked to begin work 
on the implementing measures. The Solvency II act was formally adopted on the 25
th
 of 
November 2009.  
  
7.4 The Financial Crisis and Solvency II 
The Solvency II process just described took place in a period during which most European 
economies, relatively speaking, were characterized by moderate interest rate levels along 
with stable and high economic growth. Furthermore, prior to the financial crisis, the 
European economies were relatively similar in these regards. In other words, conditions were 
beneficial for (life) insurers, as well as for the development of a harmonized European 
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regime. However, as the financial crisis and the related sovereign debt crisis unraveled, this 
situation was about to be significantly altered. 
7.4.1 The European Wedge 
When the de Larosière report was published in February 2009, it described the present state 
of the economy as “the most serious and disruptive financial crisis since 1929” and went on 
to claim that to “prevent the recurrence of this type of crisis, a number of critical policy 
changes are called for”. The report saw Solvency II as an important part of the effort to bring 
about such policy changes (de Larosiére, 2009, pp. 6,22).  
 
Hence, the financial crisis created a sense of urgency in establishing the new insurance 
regulations. However, in another way, it changed the landscape of the European economy and 
insurance markets so that the necessary political compromises became harder to achieve. 
Initially, in 2009, the financial crisis affected most of the EU Member States in a similar way: 
All the main national economies slumped. However, as illustrated below, this situation was 
not to prevail as the financial crisis was transformed into a Eurozone government debt- and 
currency crisis. For reasons that go beyond the scope of this paper, a significant gap ensued in 
the EU (and the Eurozone), between, on the one hand, fast growing, competitive and 
modestly leveraged (mostly) Northern European economies and, on the other hand, 
recession-prone, uncompetitive (mostly) Southern European countries with debt levels out of 
control.  
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Figure 11: Real GDP growth rate – volume. Percentage change on previous year (Eurostat, 
2014). 
 
Figure 12: General government gross debt, percentage of GDP (International Monetary 
Fund, 2013). 
 
The combination of high levels of debt and negative growth manifested itself in the 
borrowing costs of the national economies involved. The interest rates on the debts of Italy, 
Spain, and in particular Greece, all surged as investors feared what had previously been the 
unthinkable case of sovereign default. On the other hand, the governments of the sound 
European economies, particularly Germany and the Nordics, experienced all-time low 
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borrowing costs as investors were eager to find more solid investment assets. The Eurozone 
project which was supposed to bring the continent closer together had instead created a 
financial wedge between the north and the south. 
  
 
Figure 13: Sovereign debt interest rates of selected European countries (OECD, 2014). 
 
Low, often negative, macroeconomic growth was, however, not the only concern for national 
governments. Declining stock markets, failing banks and soaring unemployment added to the 
pressure for governments to take action. In a response to these developments, Central Banks 
all over the world, including the European Central Bank and other non-Eurozone Central 
Banks in the EU, lowered interest rates in an unprecedented monetary expansion which is 
reflected in the following graph:  
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Figure 14: 3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), based on British Pound 
(Federal reserve bank St.Louis, 2014) 
 
Within just a year – from 2008 to 2009 - the 3-month LIBOR22 interest rate dropped from 
about 6 % to less than 1 %. Furthermore, the striking thing is not simply that interest rates 
have been at record low levels for a long time; there are not really any signs that this situation 
is about to change in the future as long-term interest rates are low as well. Naturally, for an 
industry that is highly dependent on the interest rate level – such as insurance – this implies a 
very significant change of circumstances which, as it turned out, happened to coincide with 
the finalization of the new regulatory regime.  
 
7.4.2 The Insurance Industry: Low Return, Low Discount 
It is the long durations of insurance liabilities, explored earlier in this essay, which makes the 
financial state of an insurer highly sensitive to changes in interest rate levels. On the one 
hand, low interest rates increase the value of insurance liabilities due to reduced discounting 
effects. On the other hand, poor financial conditions and increased risk in government bonds 
reduced the return of assets and thus the ability to pay for these liabilities in the future.   
                                                 
22
 The London Interbank Offered Rate is  is a benchmark rate that some of the world‟s leading banks charge 
each other for short-term loans (Investopedia). 
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The controversies surrounding the capital requirements of Solvency II (already reflected in 
the Group support regime and equity issues discussed above) was further increased as 
CEIOPS, in 2009 and 2010, proposed conservative implementing measures. The measures, 
which in part were a response to the financial crisis, were controversial and not welcomed by 
the industry (van Hulle, 2011, p. 184). Indeed, the industry was able to persuade the 
Commission that the advice from CEIOPS was excessively prudent, thereby altering the 
models for the fifth quantitative impact study (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2012, p. 3).  
Nonetheless, the consequences of the financial crisis were highlighted in the QIS5 study 
which was conducted in 2010 based on year-end data from 2009. In its summary report, 
EIOPA noted that  
Since the previous QIS, which was run on end 2007 accounts, the insurance sector financial 
surplus under the current solvency regime has seen a marked decrease in 2008 (of the order of 
€200bn) - followed by a partial recovery in 2009. This evolution is largely explained by the 
impact the financial crisis had on the value of assets owned by the sector, and on interest rates 
used to discount liabilities in some countries. At the end of 2009 the surplus was 
approximately €500bn (EIOPA, 2011, p. 23).  
 
Hence, the financial crisis had led to a significant increase in reserve and capital requirements 
as a consequence of the drastic reduction in the general interest rate level. Yet, it must be 
noted that once again the divisions across Europe were rather significant. As can be seen 
from the table and graph below, France and Germany had a relatively high share of solid 
companies, whereas a large proportion of British companies were close to the SCR 
requirement, which would trigger supervisory sanctions under Solvency II. 
 
High proportion of solid 
companies 
High proportion of companies 
that are below, or just above, 
the SCR requirement 
High proportion of companies 
that are below the SCR 
requirement 
France, Germany, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Finland,  Austria 
Lithuania, Portugal, Cyprus, 
Belgium, Bulgaria 
 
Greece, United Kingdom, 
Poland, Malta, Sweden, Latvia 
 
Table 3: Selected countries classified according to capitalization of companies (EIOPA, 
2011, p. 26).  
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Figure 15: Percentage of participants with different SCR solvency ratio (EIOPA, 2011, p. 
26). 
 
These differences are partly explained by trivialities, such as the fact that the participation 
ratio varied significantly from one country to the next. However, there is no doubt that it is 
also a reflection of the characteristics of markets and products referred to in the previous 
section. For instance, the relatively weak capitalization of many British insurers was a 
consequence of the fact that this is the market in which products sensitive to low interest rates 
are most developed (Dunbar, 2006).  
More generally, this situation stemmed from the fact the insurers most severely affected by 
the macro-economic development – which was mirrored in the capital requirements through 
the Solvency II QIS5 calibration – were providers of long-term guarantee products. In several 
European countries such insurers were already dealing with the (for the companies) problem 
of increased longevity, and the drop in interest rates thus worked to aggravated the already 
strained conditions.  
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The reactions, warnings and debates over the consequences for the long-term guarantee 
business have been significant. In 2009, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) sent a letter 
to the then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, arguing that insurers in Britain 
alone would need to raise capital of £50bn – close to the total value of the UK industry - in 
order to meet the capital requirements (Insurance Times, 2009). In other words, the Solvency 
II principle of valuing assets and liabilities according to market value was making insurers 
with long term liabilities dependent on short-term volatility in interest rates and the general 
macro economy. As the financial crisis brought attention to this issue, the options were clear: 
Either many companies offering traditional life insurance and long-term guarantees (LTG) 
would cease to exist, or the rules of the Solvency II capital requirements from the 
development phase would need to be altered. Based on the QIS5 study, the German Insurance 
Association (GDV) reached a similar conclusion in 2011, arguing that it “has shown that the 
regulations are not ready for implementation. The study has made it clear that there is 
substantial room for improvement in SII. We are not talking about cosmetic changes” (von 
Furstenwerth, 2011). 
 
Hence, the problems faced by life insurers were not confined to Britain alone, but were an 
issue for several European nations with a tradition for guaranteed benefit schemes. For 
example, despite its relatively solid performance in the QIS5 study, it became increasingly 
clear that German life insurers in the past had provided such guarantees that were above the 
interest rates which they could presently get (Wiedner, 2013).  In addition, as illustrated 
above, the Greek industry was characterized by the fact that the nation‟s insurers were barely 
able to satisfy the Solvency I capital requirements let alone the normally higher requirements 
under Solvency II (Tsentas, 2010). As the Eurozone crisis unraveled, more Southern 
European Member States shifted its priorities towards economic growth which (at least in the 
short run) is not necessarily compatible with a priority of prudent insurance regulation.  
 
Hence, in general, the Financial- and Eurozone crises changed the interests and divisions of 
European nations and insurance companies having in turn, as will be explored next, a 
significant effect on the Omnibus II process.  
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7.5 Omnibus II: Pre-Trialogue Process 2011-2012 
When the Omnibus II directive was proposed by the Commission in January 2011, it was 
supposed to be a rather straightforward directive with the purpose of amending Solvency II 
that had become part of European law two years earlier. The initial purposes of Omnibus II 
were, first, to adapt the level 1-text of Solvency II so it was up to date with the Lisbon Treaty, 
including the new supervisory structure characterized by the establishment of EIOPA 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2012, p. 3). Second, Omnibus II was to specify delays to 
several elements of Solvency II, such as transitional measures for capital requirements and 
provisions and reporting requirements (Carver, 2011). However, as a consequence of the 
Eurozone crisis in 2010, as well as the QIS5 report which was published in March 2011, “a 
range of industry associations and lobby groups lined up to present alternative solutions to the 
problem – the merits of which varied from pragmatism to almost opportunism, and Member 
States often backed their respective insurance industry‟s position” (Solvency II Wire, Two 
lessons from Solvency II, 2014b). As it turned out, Omnibus became an arena for discussions 
of a number of issues that surpassed what EIOPA originally intended or expected (FNAN, 
2014 [Interview]).   
 
The issue of LTG products really turned into a political debate when the European Parliament 
– in its version of the Omnibus II directive - moved the set of implementing measures that 
were to deal with LTG issues from level 2 to the Level 1 text in March 2012 (Solvency II 
Wire, 2012b). The decision by the EP to do so was indeed inconsistent with past procedures. 
During the pre-Lisbon process, the level 1 text was supposed to be principles-based only, but 
during Solvency II the Parliament held the opinion that it should contain policy choices and 
decisions as well whereas the Level 2 were to contain technical requirements only. 
According to Solvency II Wire (2014b), the decision to move the LTG measures into the 
level 1 text was a consequence of intensive lobbying, and effectively turned the technical 
matters of these measures into political bargaining chips. Furthermore, the move ensured that 
EIOPA was sidelined as it was left only with providing non-binding advice on the LTG 
issues (Ibid: 2014). This fact is important given that the Parliament upon the creation of 
EIOPA “enthusiastically welcomed the three EASs”, thereby dropping “its long standing 
opposition to the further consolidation of EU governance by means of supranational 
„agentification‟” (Everson, 2012, p. 9). Hence, even though the Parliament accepted the 
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creation of EIOPA in the first place, evidence indicates that this acceptance may be reduced 
in turn by an unwillingness to allow important decisions to be decided by the technocratic 
agency.  
Regarding the functionality of the LTG measures which was the root of the controversy the 
aim was to limit the excessive volatility in the Solvency II balance sheet as a consequence of 
changes in long-term interest rates. Several specific measures were suggested and calibrated 
during the process, namely: The Matching Adjustment (MA), the Countercyclical Premium 
(CCP) and the Yield Curve Extrapolation (YCE)
 23
. 
Although most MEP‟s supported the LTG measures as a set of adjustments to imperfect 
market prices that were necessary to keep the long-term guarantee industry profitable, the 
Green party was a particularly articulate opponent. Upon the finalization of the EP‟s position 
in March 2012, the party‟s representative Sven Giegold wrote that “the legislative process 
was a case study in the dominance of vested interests of financial lobbies over general 
interests of consumer protection, financial stability and tax payers”  (Giegold, 2012). In 
particular, he identified the insurance lobbies of Spain, Italy and the UK – along with their 
respective governments - as highly active, while consumer organizations were “totally 
absent” (Giegold, 2012). The EP was not, however, the only arena of lobbying. According to 
the minutes of an EIOPA stakeholder meeting, van Hulle pointed out that “Ministers [in the 
Council] get heavily lobbied” (EIOPA, 2012, p. 2). Against this background of high stakes 
and opposing interests, the stage was set for the trialogue discussions.  
 
7.6 Omnibus II: trialogue Process: 2012-2014 
According to the minutes of the 22
nd
 EIOPC meeting, there were significant differences 
between the legislative texts approved by the European Parliament‟s ECON Committee in 
March 2012, and the Council‟s general approach of September 2011. The Chair referred to 
both questions discussed in the previous sections as particularly difficult areas of the 
trialogue (MARKT.ddg2.h.2, 2012, p. 2).  
 
                                                 
23
 The LTGA measures are highly technical and beyond the scope of this paper. For a thorough assessment of 
the individual measures see (EIOPA, 2013c).  
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The first controversial area was the package deal of the long-term guarantees. In the 
trialogue, there was significant disagreement as for which of the LTG measures that were to 
be included and also how they were to be calibrated.  In fact, these questions turned out to be 
the main topics of the Omnibus II process. Since this was a direct consequence of the low 
interest levels, the scope of Omnibus II was indeed significantly expanded because of the 
financial crisis.  
 
The second issue was the alteration of the Lamfalussy process following the Lisbon Treaty. 
Thus, an important issue in the OII negotiations was “whether an implementing measure in 
SII should take the form for a Commission delegated act or an EIOPA regulatory technical 
standard” (MARKT.ddg2.h.2, 2012, p. 2). But this was also directly related to the LTG 
measures as there were disagreements over whether the new measures were to be included at 
level 1 or level 2. Whereas the Council suggested placing one such measure (the counter-
cyclical premium) at Level 1, and two others (extrapolation and the matching premium) at 
level 2, the Parliament wanted all these measures as part of Level 1 (Towers Watson, 2013). 
 
During the first months of the trialogue in 2012, it was clear that the gap between the three 
parties was so great that the progress of the process as a whole was held up over these issues. 
In a press release issued on the 12
th
 of July 2012 it was announced that all parties in the 
trialogue had agreed “to commission an impact study of the various schemes on long-term 
guarantee measures” (Solvency II Wire, 2012c).   
 
The decision to launch the LTGA study led to a slowdown in the Omnibus II process and 
subsequent delays to implementation of the regulatory framework. The impact study was in 
essence a request from the trialogue parties to EIOPA, “to review the design and the 
calibration of the standard formula to encourage certain long-term investments” (Wiedner, 
2013). In the report which was published on the 14
th
 of June 2013, EIOPA gave its advice for 
each of the LTG measures. 
In essence, the underlying question for each measure is how insurance liabilities are to be 
discounted and thus valued, questions which have a significant impact on the amount of 
capital that insurers are to set aside for reserves and capital requirements. Although the LTG 
measures are technical and complex, the principles that they represent may be of crucial 
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political importance. In practice, this implies that a slight adjustment in a decimal number of 
a mathematical model today may in fact be the difference between a profitable business and 
insolvency in the future. In turn, this may be of crucial importance for insurance and pension 
customers. One news site pointed this out, stating that 
The contrast between the minutiae of the technical details under discussion and the potential 
huge adverse effects on the retirement prospects of so many policyholders can hardly be 
grasped. In fact it is not grasped: that is why this debate is receiving so little attention outside 
of the SII community (Solvency II Wire, 2012a).  
 
In the LTGA study, EIOPA tested, and gave its opinion, on the measures that were discussed 
during the trialogue. According to the report, out of the 213 life insurers participating in the 
study, 56 would fall short of reaching the SCR requirement at year-end 2011 without the 
measures, as the result of a total shortage of €90bn by the companies participating in the 
study (EIOPA, 2013, pp. 32, 158). The fact that such a significant portion of participating 
insurance companies proved to be undercapitalized, could essentially stem from at least one 
of two causes: Either the model calibration was too conservative and prudent; or the model 
gave a realistic solidity requirement for an industry that was actually undercapitalized. The 
latter explanation would have serious implications for the long-term guarantees market in 
several Member States. A reasonable point of view is that both explanations hold some merit. 
Even though important real drivers of the life insurance business have turned against the 
companies in recent years, demanding that long-run market values are influenced by short 
term interest volatility (i.e. according to the Solvency II standard) may still not be reasonable. 
This was also observed by van Hulle who noted that: “We have to take artificial volatility out 
of the system; otherwise these products will not be offered” (Davis, 2011). 
Although the LTG measures suggested by EIOPA reduced the SCR-requirements for 
European insurers with more than €220bn24 (EIOPA, 2013, p. 2; EIOPA, 2013, p. 32), the 
response from the stakeholders in the insurance industry was generally negative. For 
example, Insurance Europe wrote that its preliminary review “raises significant concerns that 
the measures proposed would not work as intended” (Insurance Europe, 2013a). AMICE also 
expressed concerns about some the EIOPA recommendations in a different letter (AMICE, 
2013). Furthermore, it was indeed clear that the advice of EIOPA automatically were to be 
                                                 
24
 These figures are of course subject to substantial uncertainty. However, if the reserve requirements – and not 
only the SCR requirements – are taken into account they are most likely substantially higher.  
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adhered to. In response to a question on whether EIOPAs recommendations were weakened 
in order to make possible a political compromise, Wiedner (of the Commission) replied that  
No one should have expected that we would take EIOPA‟s technical report and say „well 
done, we will adopt it”. There is a political process. The commission said it wanted the 
negotiations to be made on the basis of the report and the other parties accepted the „menu‟ 
under pressure. But it was clear that the calibrations would move. There are some red lines, 
obviously, but in our view these have not been crossed (Wiedner, 2013). 
 
Nonetheless, the advice from the EIOPA study had enabled the trialogue to pick up the pace 
and to finally reach this compromise on the LGT-package was finally reached in on 
November 13
th
.  
In the end the insurance industry avoided this outcome as many of EIOPA‟s suggestions in 
the LTGA report were diluted and hence made more liberal in terms of reserve and capital 
requirements. In total, the Council compromise reduced the capital requirements with an 
additional €47bn relative to EIOPA‟s suggestion in the LTGA report (EIOPA, 2013b). The 
Green party of the EP was once again highly critical of the compromise, commenting that 
“years of intensive lobbying have paid off for the insurance companies of the largest Member 
States. The industry achieved to lower prudential capital requirements and hence increase 
profits for long term insurance products” (Giegold, 2013). The outcome of the LTG-process 
does indeed appear to provide some evidence in this direction as the various measures appear 
to have been almost tailor-made for specific countries: the UK and Spain benefitted from the 
Matching Adjustment, Italy and France “got” the Volatility Balancer whereas both the Yield 
Curve Extrapolation and the Transitional measures improved the solidity of insurers in a host 
of countries, yet most clearly in Germany.  
 
Once this issue was resolved however, the trialogue was able to find a compromise on 
Omnibus II. The formal vote which adopted the level 1 text of the directive with 560 to 130 
votes (with four abstentions) took place the 11
th
 of March (Solvency II Wire, 2014a). 
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8 Interpreting Solvency II 
 
In this chapter we return to the initial question stated in the first chapter:  
Is the political process of the Solvency II directive best explained by expert 
knowledge; Member State interests; or by the influence of sectoral interests?   
 
In order to answer this, we investigate each of the sub-hypotheses from chapter 4 individually 
in the following three sections. Next, the perspectives are brought together in the final section 
of the chapter where the relevance of each of the three main hypotheses are discussed.  
8.1 The Knowledge-Based Directive 
Throughout this paper, the complexities of the insurance industry and the heterorgeneity of 
the European market have been emphasized. Hence, it is clear that the contribution of 
technical experts has been required in the Solvency II process. In this section we investigate 
the following hypothesis based on the empirical evidence.  
 
H1.1 Epistemic communities have existed, and are possible to identify, in the 
Solvency II process 
 
According to Davis Cross (2013, p. 138), the literature is unclear about the type of groups 
that constitute epistemic communities, and she suggests that the concept has been interpreted 
too narrowly in the past. To some extent, the author points out certain ways in which this 
interpretation can be broadened. For one thing, she argues that epistemic communities may 
be located within government structures, and furthermore goes on to claim that “it does not 
matter whether members of an epistemic community come together organically, are spurred 
to action by an NGO, or are brought together by governments to form an advisory 
committee
25” (Davis Cross, 2013, pp. 153-154). These suggestions are also in line with Haas‟ 
original article in which he maintained that the extent to which an epistemic community 
consolidates bureaucratic power within national administrations and international secretariats, 
it stands to institutionalize its influence and insinuate its views into broader international 
politics” (Haas, 1992, p. 4). With this in mind it does not appear that characterizing 
                                                 
25
 Italics added. 
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institutionalized entities as epistemic communities break with past use of the concept.  Hence, 
such actors may be identified even as formal participants in the process.  
A clear candidate of an epistemic community within the framework of development of 
financial regulation in the European Union, then, is CEIOPS and even more so its more 
powerful successor, EIOPA.  
EIOPA 
Although EIOPA is rather distant from the typical image of the voluntary, unorganized and 
arbitrary epistemic community, the causes that led to the establishment of EIOPA – namely 
the financial crisis – is in line with the “central avenue for epistemic community influence 
[which] is generally understood to be post-crisis conditions of uncertainty for decision-
makers” (Davis Cross, 2013, p. 151). Thus, based on the fact that EIOPA (and its 
predecessor) to a large extent can be characterized as an “advisory committee”, it can be 
argued that EIOPA is – or at least shares some of the important characteristics of – an 
epistemic community.  
Prior to its establishment, the de Larosiére report argued that the new European institutions of 
financial supervision should be  
independent from possible political and industry influences, at both EU and national level. 
This means that supervisors should have clear mandates and tasks as well as sufficient 
resources and powers. In order to strengthen legitimacy and as a counterpart for 
independence, proper accountability to the political authorities at the EU and national levels 
should be ensured. In short, supervisory work must be independent from the political 
authorities, but fully accountable to them (de Larosiére, 2009, p. 47).  
 
 
Indeed, as we have seen, EIOPA was to a large extent established in accordance with this 
report; the aim for the organization was from the beginning that it should be devoid of 
political and national interests. However, there may of course be a significant gap between 
the intentions and the formal set up of an organization compared with how it is actually 
operating. Thus, before we can assume that EIOPA has functioned as an epistemic 
community, this needs to be investigated further. One way of doing so, is to consider how the 
working groups set up by EIOPA – in which national supervisors participate – function. For 
this purpose, the interview with the Norwegian FSA is a useful source given that the 
interviewees have first-hand experience. Regarding their role in EIOPA working groups, the 
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interviewees expressed clearly that they take part in these discussions as neutral experts. 
Thus, their aim is to contribute to the best possible regulatory framework, rather than to 
defend national policies and interests. This is in line with the findings of Isaksen (2012, pp. 
48-50). However, one interviewee also expressed that they do not necessarily always 
experience that this is the case for the supervisors of every other states  (FNAN, 2014 
[Interview]). For obvious reasons, this is difficult to verify especially as the interests of the 
participating countries, as well as their supervisory traditions, differ significantly.  
However, even if the national experts involved appear not mainly to be pursuing their 
national interests, it still appears that the discussions between national supervisors in the 
EIOPA working groups are not free from politics. The explanation is that the Commission is 
often involved relatively early on in the process, and may well provide the working groups 
with guidance based on political discussions that have already taken place. If EIOPA truly 
was an epistemic community, it should not really be expected that such information would 
alter the recommendations of EIOPA, unless complemented by persuasive arguments. 
However, according to the interviewee, the result may often be that “attempts are made to 
follow these political signals before it is really required” (FNAN, 2014 [Interview]). On the 
one hand, this may weaken the case for EIOPA as an epistemic community, but on the other 
hand it may be argued that it is a rational strategy not to produce draft legislation or 
recommendations that are unrealistic from a political perspective.  
Another respondent also noted that there has been a certain development when it comes to the 
presence of politics in EIOPA meetings: “In the beginning [of the Omnibus II process], the 
discussions in EIOPA were completely dominated by technical issues. However, once the 
political signals became clearer it has been easier to note a consistency between the various 
nations‟ interests and their positions during EIOPA meetings” (FNAN, 2014 [Interview]).  
Hence, we cannot conclude that all arenas hosted by EIOPA are purely neutral ones in which 
no political activity is ongoing. However, it would also be wrong to induce from the activities 
of national supervisors in such forums that EIOPA itself does not resemble an epistemic 
community. For one thing, Haas points out the broad range of roles played, and tasks 
performed, by epistemic communities. In particular, they articulate 
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the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their 
interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and 
identifying salient points for negotiation
26
 (Haas, 1992, p. 2). 
 
Thus, based on this perspective, an epistemic community may have a more broadly defined 
role. For example, it might not only be the case that national supervisors articulate already 
defined national interests in the EIOPA working groups. It could also be the case that these 
national interests are shaped and defined as the national representatives‟ increase their 
understanding during EIOPA meetings.  
 
In order to undergo a more clear-cut examination of whether EIOPA may indeed be equated 
with an epistemic community, one may employ the criteria identified by Haas (1992) which 
were listed in chapter 4.1, and assess EIOPA against these as follows:   
 
Criteria Evaluation of suitability for EIOPA Conclusion 
Principled / 
Normative 
beliefs 
 
On a high level, it is clear that if EIOPA is 
to function according to its purpose, the 
normative beliefs must largely be shared 
across the organization. This strategic goals 
are related the quality of the EU insurance 
market and European  insurance 
supervision(EIOPA, 2014c). 
EIOPA – unlike the traditional 
epistemic community – is 
institutionalized with a clear aim and 
strategic purpose.  
 
From its actions and deliverables, we 
can infer that EIOPA employees in 
general share the strategic goals of 
EIOPA, hence this criteria is fulfilled 
Causal 
beliefs 
The main causal beliefs of EIOPA – related 
to the aims referred to above - demand 
prudent insurers with sufficient reserves 
and capital buffers. This can and should be 
achieved by government regulation and 
supervision. 
 
It seems unlikely that anyone associated 
with EIOPA would argue against this. 
Hence, this criteria is fulfilled. 
 
Knowledge: 
Shared 
notion of 
validity  
 
EIOPA appears to believe in the use of 
consultations and impacts studies. 
However, the extent which EIOPA weighs 
evidence based on these findings against 
other sources of knowledge is unclear.  
Fulfilled to some extent, but 
inconclusive. 
 
Shared 
Interests 
 
Ideally, this would be the case for EIOPA. 
However, EIOPA involves representatives 
of various highly different national FSAs. 
Furthermore, it is a professional work place 
Criteria not fulfilled, although it is most 
likely true for many of its employees. 
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with paid employees, rather than a 
composition of voluntary idealists.  
 
Thus, although the employees of EIOPA 
certainly should be expected to desire the 
realization of the organization‟s aims, this 
can most likely not be said to be the main 
motivation – like one would expect from a 
voluntary organization - for why they 
contribute to the cause of EIOPA.  
 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that EIOPA is not an epistemic community in the traditional sense. 
However, given that it does score rather well on the criteria outlined above, a qualified 
assumption – rather than a conclusion – is that EIOPA does in fact resemble an epistemic 
community. At the very least, it has replaced the need for one.   
 
 
The Insurance Industry 
 
Earlier in this paper we have seen how the insurance industry, most prominently represented 
by Insurance Europe, has by far been the most active stakeholder. From the very beginning of 
the Solvency II process, insurers were brought in to contribute to the extensive consultative 
process which defined the development phase and included calls for advice as well as 
quantitative impact studies on Pillar 1. Given that five (six if the LTGA is included) such 
studies have been conducted, with a high participation rate from European insurers; this is 
where the industry has spent the most time in Solvency II participation. Due to the technical 
nature of insurance this has been a necessity, not only for the legislators to get the legitimacy 
from the industry it is to regulate, but also in order to get the information which has been 
required in order to do so properly. Without the contribution of the insurance industry, it 
would not have been possible - even in theory – to construct an optimal directive.   
 
With a possible exception of Groupe Consultatif (AAE), the industry is too heterogeneous 
and prone to sectoral interests for such a conclusion to be reached. However, there is no 
doubt that the insurance industry in many cases has contributed greatly with neutral 
information, data and (technical) advice, thereby replacing the need for more traditional 
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epistemic communities. In other words, the chief interest of the industry has, during most of 
the process, been to contribute to a best possible, knowledge-based regulatory regime.  
 
H1.2 The opinions and recommendations of the identified epistemic 
communities prevailed at important conjunctures of the Solvency II 
process 
 
In order to assess this hypothesis, it is first helpful to evaluate the criteria assembled by Davis 
Cross (2013, p. 144), which provide guidance as for when Epistemic communities are more 
likely to be persuasive: 
Epistemic communities are more likely to be persuasive when:  
Suitable 
description of 
CEIOPS/EIO
PA during 
SII/OII  
Scope 
conditions 
 There is uncertainty surrounding the issue because it is complex 
or new (uncertainty from perceived crisis) 
 The issue is surrounded by uncertainty and it is politically salient 
(continuous uncertainty) 
 The decision-makers they are trying to persuade are unhappy 
with past policies and present problems (uncertainty from 
perceived crisis) 
    Yes (OII) 
Yes 
Yes, to some 
extent 
Political 
opportunity 
structure 
 they have access to all necessary top decision-makers 
 
 they anticipate other actors‟ preferences and actions despite 
fluidity in the system (as in the EU) 
Yes, to some 
extent 
 Questionable 
Phase in the 
policy 
process 
 they seek to influence the terms of the initial debate, instead of 
the decision itself 
 they deal with subsystem, technocratic phase of decision-
making, rather than shaping broader political beliefs 
Yes 
Yes(?) 
Coalition 
building 
 The networks they are competing against are not as cohesive or 
certain of their aims 
 They share a high level of professional norms and status 
     Varies 
Yes 
Policy field 
coherence 
 There is respected quantitative data, instead of very subjective 
qualitative data 
 The issue involves natural systems (that is, the environment), 
instead of social systems 
 Their norms and policy goals are compatible with existing 
institutional norms 
Yes 
No 
Questionable 
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Although the evaluation of CEIOPS/EIOPA in the table above is admittedly simplistic, it 
does – for what it is worth – lead us to expect that there were good conditions for their 
persuasiveness during the process.  
One of the key points in this exposition has been the fact that when it comes to the level 1-
text of the legislation, the politicians in the trialogue will always have the final say on the 
outcome. On this level, both CEIOPS and EIOPA have had advisory roles only. Hence, the 
only formal way through which the epistemic community (for the SII and OII processes 
assumed to be equivalent with EIOPA, and to a lesser extent CEIOPS) could have a direct 
impact on the directive text is when their opinion is requested, and adhered to, by the 
trialogue parties.  
However, this does not necessarily imply that they had no impact whatsoever. Although 
EIOPA was deprived of control over the concrete specifications of the LTG measures, it was 
still given a prominent advisory role in the trialogue on Omnibus II after the three parties 
agreed to request the LTGA study.  
Furthermore, the epistemic community may potentially have a significant impact in the 
development phase which also affects the agenda of the trialogue discussions. For example, 
CEIOPS/EIOPA might have been achieved by affecting the agenda of the trialogue. Either 
this could be done through actions that made otherwise critical topics uncontroversial, or it 
would happen if CEIOPS or EIOPA managed to bring legislation they were unhappy with to 
the debating table of the trialogue.  
It is difficult to assess the importance of these potential channels of influence in the current 
case. Nonetheless, the parts of the level 1 directive that were agreed to by the politicians, 
without ever being a controversial part of the trialogue, make up a very large share of the 
legislation and are designed in the expert-led process in which CEIOPS played a crucial role. 
In particular, this has been the case in relation to pillar 2 and 3, on which there has been a 
relatively high degree of consensus from the beginning. 
Furthermore, at the level 2, and particular 3, of the Lamfalussy process, the power of the 
epistemic community is significant. This was the case in the Solvency II process, but even 
more so in the Omnibus II process following the establishment of EIOPA. The fact that 
EIOPA were given enhanced powers also demonstrates that the role of the experts in the 
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epistemic community gained prominence following the crisis. Hence, even though EIOPA‟s 
recommendations in the LTGA report were not fully adhered to by the politicians, the 
Lisbon-treaty has ensured that EIOPA in the future will be making final legislation, 
enhancing the independence of this epistemic community. 
In sum, there can be little doubt that the epistemic communities of CEIOPS and EIOPA have 
had a significant impact on the Solvency II and Omnibus II process. However, it must be 
admitted that the influence has been greatest in the least controversial areas of the directive. 
That is, in the development phase; in pillar 2 and 3; and in the less-controversial areas of 
pillar 1. When it comes to the most disputed parts of the directive – most prominently the 
LTGA debate – EIOPA was left without formal powers whereas its advice was heavily 
criticized and, in several cases, disregarded. 
Insurance Industry 
As underlined above, insurance companies most certainly participated and impacted the 
process by providing information and knowledge. Particularly, this was the case during the 
development phase prior to the financial crisis, which is when a significant portion of the 
directive was created.  From this perspective, it can thus credibly be argued that the insurance 
industry has been involved in the Solvency II process first and foremost as providers of 
information, and only secondary in the pursuit of sectoral interests. There is no doubt that 
involvement of the companies as contributors of information – both in terms of time spent, 
number of companies involved and in terms of the portion of the directive that was affected – 
many times surpass the efforts spent on lobby activities. 
Furthermore, it could in fact also be argued that the involvement of the industry in the 
discussions on the LTG measures during the Omnibus II process was motived by the pursuit 
for a knowledge-based directive rather than by sectoral interests. This argument is valid if 
one accepts that the industry‟s  so called lobbying – rather than having avoided a too 
restrictive and prudent regulatory regime – was motivated by efforts to ensure a more realistic 
and evidence-based regulatory outcome, evidence which happened to imply less capital 
requirements.  
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8.2 The Bargained Directive 
Given the importance of the insurance sector in many Member States, it should be expected 
that there is a certain degree of correlation between the interests of a nation and the interests 
of its insurance industry. Throughout this paper it has been stressed that significant 
differences exist between the insurance markets of the Member States, each of which has a 
distinct set of interests. This essentially gives away this study‟s conclusion on the next 
hypothesis: 
 
H2.1 The EU member states have had significantly different interests during 
the Solvency II process 
 
Clearly, there is evidence to support this, and even more so as the interests diverged further as 
a result of the financial crisis. In sum, we have seen above how the Member State‟s national 
insurance markets differ on several accounts:  
 Size: About 80 % of the European life insurance market premiums, and more than 60 
% of the non-life premiums, are written either in the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany or Italy. The combined volume for Eastern Europe make up only about 3-4 
%. As illustrated in figure 8, there are also significant national differences even when 
adjusted for gaps in population and income levels. 
 Composition: Life insurance is of greater relative importance in the wealthier 
countries with traditional welfare states. Especially this is the case for Member States 
in North- and Western Europe and less so for the, traditionally, more family-based 
systems of some Southern European countries or the former communist states of 
Eastern Europe.  
 Capitalization: The capitalization of life insurers in general, and those with guaranteed 
benefits schemes in particular, was severly aggravated by the financial crisis and the 
new normality of low interest rates.  
 Domestic Market structure: Some national markets consist of large, complex 
insurance groups that are based in the country. Other national markets are dominated 
by branches of foreign insurance companies whose headquarters are located abroad.  
 Regulation and supervision: The experience, culture and resources of national 
regulators across Europe vary significantly. 
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Early on in the Solvency II process, at the beginning of the century, the financial conditions 
of European states and insurance companies were relatively solid. National economic growth, 
as well as interest rate levels, were high compared with the current situation. Thus, even 
though insurers and authorities across Europe had different concerns, these were less 
articulate and not as pressing as were to be the case after the financial crisis. A respondent 
from the Norwegian FSA commented that  
 
in such a situation it is easy to be somewhat bold and agree to conservative capital 
requirements. However, the issue arises once the financial conditions deteriorate, and the 
pressure increases. Then, attempts are made to adjust the capital or the capital requirement so 
that the effect of the fluctuations and the financial stress is reduced. One may ask what sort of 
risk-based system is really in place if the actual economic cycles are not reflected (FNAN, 
2014 [Interview]). 
 
When the crisis ensued, with low growth, low discount rates and low return on assets, it made 
the Solvency II directive significantly more costly for many insurers and member states. 
Thus, the national interests diverged – and the pressure to pursue these interests increased - 
during the process.  
 
A possible objection to this chain of logic which assumes altered interests for insurers and 
nation states may, however, be put forth as follows. The economy is dynamic and unlikely to 
stay the same for many years and decades. Thus, although the current conditions are 
challenging under the Solvency II standard model it could be argued that what is required is a 
long term perspective, not alteration of the rules. In other words, one would expect the 
national interest to change if the current situation of low interest rates were (expected) to last 
indefinitely, but it is far from certain that this will be the case. Hence, the national interests 
should be affected only to a limited extent if the long-term view is kept in mind. However, 
valid as this point may be in theory, it is a somewhat naïve perspective given that – as a fact 
of human nature - insurers, politicians and lobbyists have a bias towards the short-term and 
tend to discount the consequences in a future that they might not even themselves be part of. 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the national interests did in fact change as a 
consequence of the crisis. This was indeed confirmed by one interviewee:  
it is clear that many member states have altered their point of view as a consequence of the 
financial crisis and the problems they are facing. If one had traced the statements made by the 
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various national representatives throughout the process it would surely make up an interesting 
set of data which most likely would have reflected this (FNAN, 2014 [Interview]).  
 
Clearly, the fact that the capital requirement may be reduced in the long run is of limited 
comfort to insurers if they expect that they have to close down business due to high capital 
requirements next year. This becomes a national political concern as well if it is happening to 
a significant share of a domestic industry.  
 
Furthermore, it could be argued that it is the Solvency II regulations – without the LTGA 
measures – that were too simplistic given that short term volatility was allowed to have an 
excessive effect on the capital requirements of long term business. As pointed out by the 
representative of Gjensidige: “the new information one acquires in any given quarter, on 
developments that are several decades away, is very limited. This implies that the capital 
requirement should not change so much either, but the challenge is to find good mechanisms 
that can ensure this in a suitable way” (Gjensidige, 2014 [Interview]). Hence, based on this 
reasoning the altered national interests may in fact be reasonable. Based on this view, it was 
the theoretical Solvency II model that was too simplistic and sensitive to short term changes, 
and it needed to be changed regardless of national or sectoral interests.  
 
Whether this reasoning is justified or not from a neutral and theoretical point of view, the 
Omnibus II process illustrated that the national interests pursued did in fact change and 
diverge, as the LTGA process led to new debates on parts of the directive that had previously 
been agreed to.  
 
H2.2 These diverging interests have been decisive in shaping the policy process 
of Solvency II 
 
The national interests of the Member States may certainly have been incorporated into the 
Solvency II process in different ways. One possible channel is through participation in the 
development phase. Another possibility is through direct or indirect lobbyism, for example of 
the European Parliament. It is, however, through the Council and during the trialogue 
meetings that the national interests are most clearly shaping the process as the real 
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negotiations are taking place. Hence, this is what the scope of this analysis will be 
constrained to.  
 
In general, the gaps between different Member States have made the regulations - which 
originally were supposed to be principles based – more detailed in order to include the many 
compromises that have been reached throughout the process (Gjensidige, 2014 [Interview]). 
Furthermore, as discussed above, there are several specific examples (from the trialogue) of 
how national interests influenced the Solvency II directive. Among the most controversial (at 
least prior to Omnibus II) took place in the Council Working Group where the Group support 
regime was removed from the draft directive, in exchange for measures on equity risk. The 
removal of the Group support regime, which was especially unwanted in parts of central- and 
Eastern Europe, happened in spite of the recommendations from CEIOPS and experts who 
had been involved in the development of the directive, including the de Larosiére report. 
Furthermore, it was removed against the will of Insurance Europe.  
 
This is particularly interesting as it may be inferred from this that national interests may go 
against both the prudent European regulator (whose main concern is for the consumers) and 
the insurance organizations (whose main concern is for the profit-seeking insurance 
companies) at the same time. This is puzzling as one might expect every nation to have in its 
national interest at least one of these perspectives at any time. Yet, although the Group 
support regime perhaps was sufficiently prudent for the citizens of the EU as a whole, several 
Member States felt that it was not sufficiently prudent for the consumers in their respective 
home countries. This concern increased further as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
Certainly, this question must have been challenging for Insurance Europe as well, as its 
decision to support the Group support regime was mainly in line with the interests of the 
biggest insurance companies operating in the largest markets. Furthermore, it is a very clear 
example of how (in line with the MLG approach discussed below) the private insurance 
association – although unsuccessful – was an advocate of the part of the Solvency II directive 
which perhaps most clearly is linked with European integration. 
 
The Group Support issue is not only an example of how diverging interests had an important 
impact on the outcome of Solvency II, but also demonstrates how a group consisting mainly 
of smaller EU nations (especially in terms of insurance volume) may make this happen 
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against the will of the most powerful nations. Although these nations were able to alter the 
directive in accordance with their interests in this case, there is still little doubt that it is the 
most populous nations, with the largest insurance markets and the most developed regulatory 
traditions that have had the most impact and success in getting their views across in the 
Solvency II process.  
 
What the examples of the Group support regime and the LTG measures have in common is 
that there were significant costs and risks at stake. The LTG measures have reduced the 
required level of capital by €260bn which, as we have seen, was more than the effect of the 
financial crisis identified in the QIS5
27
. The Group support regime would have allowed 
multinational insurance groups to move large amounts of capital out of states in which their 
subsidiaries operate. Yet, this became unacceptable as the political discussion coincided with 
the crisis, and the financial distress experienced by many European countries increased the 
importance of solid financial institutions as part of the national interest. Hence, even though 
the influence of the epistemic communities – as discussed above – and of the Commission 
have had significant influence in many areas of the legislation, it is the national interests 
which prevail when it comes down to clear economic interests.  
 
8.3 The Plural Directive 
In this section we examined the extent to which non-state actors – unless identified as experts 
in 8.1 - have independently impacted the process. We then move on to discuss whether the 
EU institutions have been able to influence the process beyond what the LI perspective would 
suggest.  
 
H3.1 Non-Governmental stakeholders – other than epistemic communities – 
have participated in, and influenced, the Solvency II process 
 
Previously, it has been noted how the political process of Solvency II was influenced by a 
significant number of non-governmental actors, but for the sake of brevity, our focus has 
                                                 
27
 Although these figures are subject to significant uncertainty and also not necessarily divided equally between 
firms. 
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been on the insurance industry which anyway has made up the most active and successful 
stakeholders. In chapter 4, two separate ways in which such stakeholders may impact the 
process were identified: Information and capture. The former was already discussed above in 
the section on epistemic communities where it was made clear that insurance companies have 
served a critical role as providers of information and knowledge. The MLG perspective 
predicts that stakeholder contributions are of greater significance in technical and complex 
industries, and this is certainly the situation in the case of insurance (Trnski, 2005, p. 24). 
Hence, the direct influence of insurers – through its role as provider of technical advice and 
data – supports both of these perspectives. 
 
Yet, there is little doubt that the participation of insurers in the Solvency II process also has 
been motived by the fact that they have significant economic interests in the outcome of the 
process, and that the industry exercised its right to pursue these interests. This was for 
example expressed by the Green Party MEP, Sven Giegold, who wrote that the day in which 
the EP approved the Omnibus II directive was “A truly black day for everyone who hopes 
that the EP could overcome national interest driven regulatory capture in the financial 
industry” (Giegold, 2012).  
 
To some extent, the interests of the insurance companies have coincided with that of the 
Member States. Given that insurance companies are among the most important institutions of 
modern societies; what is good for the insurer is often also good for society as a whole.  
However, this logic only goes so far. As was discussed in chapter 2; unregulated insurance 
companies cannot be expected to organize themselves in such a way as to first and foremost 
aim to benefit society as a whole, especially not in the long run. Like other corporate 
companies, insurers are required to produce profitable results for their owners in the short 
run. Unlike most other companies, however, there is no way of knowing for the insurer what 
this result will be until the last of its current customers die several decades from today. All 
serious companies want to set aside sufficient reserves, but when it is unknown what 
“sufficient” amounts to, it should be expected that many insurance companies would prefer 
having better financial results today instead of having excessive reserves some decades into 
the future. 
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There can in fact be little doubt that the legislators to some extent were influenced by 
regulatory capture during the Omnibus II process. On the one hand, the industry may credibly 
argue that the measures were necessary to deal with the imperfections of the standard model 
as it was near consensus that something needed to be done about the impact of the short-term 
volatility on discount rates. But on the other hand, the calibrations which were in the end 
agreed to imply that the markets cannot really be trusted. Since market values are what 
Solvency II is based on, this is arguably a problem. Furthermore, it is nonetheless true that 
“corporations can now distribute profits even if market values suggest that they might not be 
able to meet claims of policy holders” (Giegold, 2013). The LTGA measures do provide 
many European life insurers with significant short term relief, even though it is questionable 
whether it is justified. Given the numerous adjustments that have been made to the discount 
rate curve, it is certainly reasonable to ask what this implies for the overarching, theoretical 
principles of prudence that were originally agreed to.    
Yet, it is not necessarily possible to conclude from this that insurance companies were 
independently able to significantly influence the process. The causality is disturbed by the 
noise of the nation states, whose interests largely coincided with those of their domestic 
insurers. Hence, even though the insurance companies most likely were able to “capture” the 
process to some extent, it is difficult to know whether this was possible only because the 
(largest) Member State considered this behavior to be in the best national interest. On the 
other hand, this argument is less persuasive given the presence of large multinational 
insurance corporations at the core of the debate. It is not unlikely that these have been able to 
influence the process beyond what the national interests of the country in which it resides 
would suggest. However, drawing such conclusions are not justified based on the present 
study.   
On a more technical note, the interests of the insurance industry are in essence linked to the 
calculation of the capital requirements. The high capital requirements that were suggested by 
CEIOPS following the financial crisis and by EIOPA as the outcome of the LTGA 
calculations, the reactions to which from the industry were generally negative, can essentially 
be interpreted in three separate ways.  
1. It can be argued that the model was indeed “correct” and that insurers in general were 
undercapitalized. The consequences would be a need for these European insurers to 
increase their SCR coverage ratios and for politicians and insurers to accept this fact. 
98 
 
This would then have been consistent with the knowledge based approach, devoid of 
special interests. Clearly, this is not what happened.  
2. Second, if the model was regarded as “incorrectly” calibrated for its purpose, the 
implication – also in accordance with the knowledge based approach – would be to 
adjust it e.g. by introducing the LTGA measures.  
3. The third and final option is that the model was in fact “correctly” calibrated, and 
hence increased capitalization.  However, as the consequences of this would have 
been losses and closure of business for many insurers, this outcome would be against 
the short-term interests of many shareholders as well as politicians who would reject 
the first ption of increased capitalization and instead demand alleviating measures. 
Hence, based on this reasoning, the LTGA measures were introduced – and 
indulgently calibrated – not mainly on the basis of expert judgement. Rather the 
LTGA package was a set of redistributive measures in which the short-term interests 
of politicians, shareholders (and some customers of today) were up against the 
interests of the insurance customers of the future. Hence, according to this interest 
based approach, the LTGA measures were introduced and calibrated beyond what was 
rational from a technical and evidence-based perspective. 
 
The problem is that there is really no possible way to determine whether the LTG measures 
are best explained by the second or the third option. Most likely, the truth is somewhere in 
between, and this appears also to be the conclusion of EIOPA which wrote that 
the crisis has highlighted an important element that needs to be addressed: volatility and its 
consequences. It is EIOPA‟s view that volatility is a fact, which is shown by market 
consistent valuation, and should be an integral part of the risk management of companies, 
both as a risk and a potential business opportunity [i.e. the LTGA measures should be 
limited]. At the same time, if not appropriately understood, it may lead to “artificial” – in the 
sense of unnecessary – consequences or actions, including supervisory action, which should 
be avoided, in particular regarding short-term volatility [i.e. the LTGA measures are required] 
(EIOPA, 2013, p. 21). 
 
On the one hand, the interest rate curve appears to put excessive weight on short term 
fluctuations in interest rates when valuing long term liabilities. Thus, the model was to some 
extent “incorrect” in relying on market valuations to such an extent. On the other hand, it 
does not appear to be the case that the interest curve extrapolations during the OII process 
have been replaced with a more scientifically valid alternative. According to one interviewee 
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in the Norwegian FSA, the convergence debate has been a case in point where the technical 
criteria for the chosen interest rate curve appears to have been replaced by short-term national 
and industry interests, aiming to reduce the capital requirements of life insurance companies 
(FNAN, 2014 [Interview]). This opinion is shared by other experts as well, one of whom 
noted that “the 20 year LLP that emerged from the ECON Committee in March 2012 was a 
pure compromise with no technical justification and, I suspect, simply an average of the 
competing 10 and 30 year proposals” (Fulcher, 2013). A different study writes that “Our 
assessment of the new calibration of bond risk as defined by the LTGA impact study does not 
conclusively confirm it as an improvement on the calibration under QIS5” (EDHEC, 2013). 
In sum, it appears to be beyond reasonable doubt that the calibrations of the LTGA measures, 
at least to some extent, have been motivated by short-term economic and political gains. 
 
H3.2 The supranational EU institutions were independent actors in the 
Solvency II process, and affected the outcome 
 
Although several EU institutions and agencies have been involved in the Solvency II process, 
it is not assumed necessary to include in the assessment of H3.2 institutions that are 
obviously not independent of the Member State interests, such as the Council. Hence, the 
focus here is directed towards the EU institutions that are (predominantly) guided by other 
aims.  
 
European parliament 
From the exposition and analysis of this paper, it should be clear that the EP has not been a 
mere facilitator or bystander to the process of Solvency II. In the Co-decision procedure, that 
is the level 1 procedure in the Lamfalussy process, the EP was highly involved and appears to 
have been much like an equal to the Council. This was particularly evident during the SII 
trialogue, in which the representatives of the Parliament refused to accept the removal of the 
Group support regime or the inclusion of the equity measures. Hence, the Council was able to 
get its views across only by reaching a compromise. However, when it came to the 
implementing measures of Solvency II the EP were clearly at risk of being sidelined by the 
Council (through EIOPC) and the Commission. Although the EP held some rights in relation 
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to these level 2 documents, it was still not able to control – to the same extent as the Council 
– that the level 1 legislation was implemented as planned.   
However, following the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, this lack of control was removed as the 
legislative procedure and the Lamfalussy process was altered accordingly. The change 
significantly enhanced the powers of the EP over the level 2 documents and what should be 
delegated to the Commission and EIOPA. The result, as expressed by Wiedner was that “part 
of the discussion [in Omnibus II] is about what should go into the level 1 text, what should be 
fixed in the delegated acts and what should be left for EIOPA” (Wiedner, 2013).  
In turn, the Parliament was responsible for the inclusion of LTGA measures in the level 1 text 
during the Omnibus II process, thus essentially ensuring that these became part of the 
trialogue. According to Giegold, this happened only after heavy lobbying, implying from the 
industry and Member States also identify the EP as a crucial actor in the process. The fact 
that the LTGA measures were made part of the level 1 discussion was perhaps the most 
important event of the Omnibus II process, as it led to prolonged political debates on 
alternatives worth billions of Euros.  
 
It is clear enough that the EP affected the outcome of the SII+OII process and that its 
influence increased following the Lisbon Treaty. However, the extent to which it did so 
independently, and not only to the extent that it was within Member State interests, is not 
possible to answer based on this study. Arguably, the Member States have given up some 
level of sovereignty to the EP, but as this study indicates, when it comes down to the 
questions that are really of crucial national interest, the most powerful nation states are still in 
command.   
 
The Commission and EIOPA 
The Commission has been at the core of the Solvency II process essentially leading it from 
the very beginning, and it is the only institution that has been highly involved throughout the 
preparatory and development phases of Solvency II and in both the trialogues (SII and OII). It 
also has a key role in the implementation of the directive. Furthermore, Karel van Hulle, who 
ran the project between 2004 and 2013, is the single person who has generally been regarded 
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as the most important for the Solvency II legislation. In other words, there can be no doubt 
that the Commission has influenced the outcome of the directive.  
The extent to which the Commission has acted independently of the Member States during 
the Solvency II process is, however, not possible to conclude based on this study. However, 
the fact that the Commission so strongly expressed discontent with the Council‟s version of 
the SII directive does at the very least demonstrate that the former is not simply executing the 
will of the latter.  
Furthermore, as was already discussed in section 8.1, EIOPA, the supervisory agency 
formally organized in the Commission, appears to be an institution which increasingly 
operates as a European supervisor independently of the political interests of the Member 
States. Indeed, it appears that the establishment of EIOPA has created a new agency which 
private stakeholders (that is, insurance companies) relate to and are governed by, as much as 
with the national supervisors.  
The legitimacy and independence that EIOPA is gaining is based on the fact that complex 
areas of legislation and supervision are best dominated by experts. There is thus reason to 
expect that the powers of independence of EIOPA and the other two ESAs will increase as 
their competencies are enhanced. The fact that EIOPA will have access to an amount of 
insurance data which surpass any insurer, national supervisor or other government institution 
should add to this fact.  Indeed, the establishment of EIOPA should support the MLG 
hypothesis in the case of insurance regulation. Its role also points to further questions raised 
by (Everson, 2012, pp. 1-2) regarding the input legitimacy of EIOPA and the consequences 
of the technocratisation of the EU for democratic legitimacy. However, this is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
H3.2: General Assessment 
The one and a half decade of the Solvency II process appears to point towards a trend of an 
increasingly complex political system of the EU, in which the Member State executives are 
far from the only actors with influence.  
European institutions are more important when the national interests are less critical. This 
appears to make timing highly important in the European negotiation process. The Member 
States are more willing to make decisions that are at odds with their national interests if these 
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interests are uncertain and represent only future potentials. For example, prior to the financial 
crisis the Member States were (more) willing to accept the Group support regime and also to 
apply the market valued interest rate as discount factor. However, once their interests 
changed with the crisis, so did their willingness to agree to a pan-European compromise. If 
Solvency II had been in place, say, in 2004 it is not clear that it would have been as easy for 
the insurers and the Member States to get acceptance for the LTGA measures. Thus, the for 
the sake of the MLG argument, the crisis work in both ways: on the one hand, the national 
interests related to financial activities rose in prominence, thus preventing European 
integration. However, on the other hand, the transnational character of the crisis was 
unmistakable, and led among other things to the establishment of powerful and (relatively) 
independent agencies which has brought financial and insurance supervision from the 
national, to the European, level.    
 
8.4 Summing up: A Comparative Analysis  
Underneath this analysis of Solvency II has been a distinction between knowledge-based 
principles and national or sectorial interests. The distinction between principles and interests 
is certainly not an easy one to make. In fact, it belongs to the sometimes frustrating, yet 
fascinating, realm of human action of which conclusions never can be drawn with certainty. 
Indeed, it is not possible to verify whether any particular participant argues based on 
principles or based on special interests. Anyone who has taken part in the Solvency II process 
has inevitably been affected by their background, education and knowledge gained prior to 
their involvement. This is true, even though we have identified some institutions – in 
particular CEIOPS and EIOPA – as neutral and expert-driven, seeking to create an optimal 
regulatory framework unaffected by special interests. On the other hand, states and insurance 
companies are actors whose interests may well happen to coincide with what is optimal from 
a theoretical knowledge-perspective. In such cases, it is particularly difficult to assess 
whether the legislative outcome on a certain issue is achieved because it is preferred by the 
neutral epistemic community, or if it is the special interests that have achieved the desired 
outcome through bargaining.  
 
In chapter 1, we set out to answer the following question: 
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Is the political process of the Solvency II directive best explained by expert 
knowledge; Member State interests; or by sectoral interests?   
 
Which was further specified in the following three hypotheses: 
The process and outcome of the Solvency II/Omnibus II legislation has been dominated 
by: 
H1. epistemic communities seeking to achieve an optimal regulatory regime from 
a knowledge-based perspective.    
H2. the interests, power and bargaining of the nation states.  
H3. a multitude of institutions and stakeholders with different interests.  
 
In order to determine the extent to which these hypotheses can shed light on the Solvency II 
process, it is useful to draw inspiration from quasi-experiments. In particular, it appears 
fruitful to make comparisons on different parts of the process, and then attempt to explain 
these differences from the perspective of each theoretical framework. Such comparisons have 
been made along several axes throughout the paper:  
 Before and after the financial crisis (essentially Solvency II vs Omnibus II) 
 Different phases in the processes (development vs trialogue) 
 Between the three pillars 
 Between the life and the non-life industry 
 
This section thus aims to evaluate the three main hypotheses above by assessing these 
comparisons.  
 
In total, based on the findings of this study, a rather clear image of the Solvency II/Omnibus 
II process of the past decade emerges. From the initiation of the Solvency II directive, the 
Commission had a clear ambition to construct a theoretically and empirically based directive 
through public consultation with the industry and other stakeholder. The subsequent 
development phase ensured that – in most areas – the legislation obtained a solid and well-
tested basis which was set to provide the European insurance industry with significant 
improvements in risk management, capital requirements and public disclosure of information.  
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However, as the process advanced, it became more detailed and an increasing number of 
political compromises were required. The political footprint is mainly present from about 
2009 when the financial- and Eurozone crises raised the stakes for many actors involved. 
Although the crisis led to the creation of what resembles a strong, institutionalized epistemic 
community – namely EIOPA – the interests of insurers and Member States rose also 
significantly in this same period as low interest rates and increased longevity, brought about a 
crisis for parts of the life insurance industry. The group support regime, as well as the equity 
issues, was controversial during the original Solvency II trialogue.  
 
In turn, the process of Omnibus II became heavily influenced by the consequences of the 
substantial external changes, as the national interests arguably to some extent were pursued at 
the expense of the foundational principles of the directive. Although EIOPA was able to 
leave a strong mark on the Omnibus II process with the publication of the LTGA-report, the 
trialogue parties were certainly not alien to ignore the recommendations they were given.  
 
Furthermore, the non-life industry, which relatively speaking has been almost absent from the 
Omnibus II process, has been affected by the financial crisis to a much lesser extent than the 
life industry. Hence, the stakes have been lower and neither Member States nor the industry 
has had much reason to “temper” with the calibrations of the pre-crisis decisions. Two 
separate sources of this study – the Norwegian FSA and Gjensidige – did in fact concur that 
if the Solvency II directive had been separate for the non-life and the life industry, the former 
would most likely have been finalized and implemented long ago (Gjensidige, 2014 
[Interview]; FNAN, 2014 [Interview]).  
In sum, the key issues under Solvency II and Omnibus II are rather clear: The vast majority 
of these are related to pillar 1 issues, whether related to the low interest rate curve and the 
high reserve- and capital requirements of the life insurance industry (FNAN, 2014 
[Interview]) or the group support regime. On pillar 3, and even more so pillar 2, the process 
has to a much greater extent been characterized by consensus. Hence, in total, the Solvency II 
legislation has really been halted by a small part of just one of the three pillars. Furthermore, 
it has almost exclusively affected only one of the industries regulated under the directive as 
the state of the financial markets have had a serious impact on the life insurance industry. 
Hence, it is a very small subset of issues that have been of significant importance to the most 
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influential nations in the EU and thus introduced Member State interests to the very core of 
the process.  
Based on this discussion and the wider evidence of this study, the explanatory power of the 
three perspectives can be assessed as follows:  
H1. Epistemic communities and the knowledge perspective)  
- The explanatory power of H1 is particularly significant prior to 2009, that is, during the 
preparatory phase and the development phase of the Solvency II directive.  
- H1 explains the development of pillar 2 (and 3) better than pillar 1.  
- EIOPA and CEIOPS resemble epistemic communities to some extent and both have had 
an important influence on the SII and OII directives respectively thereby strengthening 
the explanatory power of H1. 
 
H2. Member State Interests  
- H2 is mainly supported in the Council Working Group and during the trialogues. 
- The Member State interests were expressed only to a limited extent during the 
development phase. 
- The explanatory power of H2 increases from 2009 and is very present in the Omnibus II 
process when were particularly high. 
- H2 is most relevant in explaining the development of pillar 1, particularly for the life 
insurance industry.  
 
H3. A multitude of institutions and stakeholders with different interests.  
- The evidence supports H3 throughout the process, however the basis changes around 
2009-10. 
- Prior to 2009 the non-governmental actors with the most influence appears to have been 
the insurance industry which contributed with data and knowledge in the development 
phase, particularly for pillar 1. 
- Following the financial crisis and the Lisbon treaty, the European Parliament gained 
increased powers and EIOPA was created. Hence, the independent influence of sovereign 
EU actors was enhanced. 
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- The insurance industry, supported by Member States, most likely affected the outcome of 
the LTGA process through lobbying.   
8.5 Generalizations 
European Integration is a process through which the differences and barriers between the 
states of Europe are gradually reduced. Since Solvency II is really a case study of a specific 
part of this integration, it is natural that generalizations from the case of Solvency II are based 
on this perspective and on the theories utilized in this study to explain it. It must be pointed 
out, however, that the list below are far from exhaustive, and that the explanatory power most 
likely increases when they apply at the same time. 
 
1. Based on the case of Solvency II, the theory of epistemic communities is more likely to 
have explanatory power when the following factors apply: 
 The complexity of the field or industry to be regulated is high. 
 The regulation in question is based on general and qualified statements. 
 The regulation in question affects Pareto-efficiency rather than redistribution. (Also 
noted by Everson (2012, p. 12)).  
 The matter in question is subject to significant uncertainty.  
 
2. Based on the case of Solvency II, the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is more 
likely to have explanatory power when the following factors apply: 
 The starting points of the Member State differ in important ways. Decisions have been 
made in the past that are difficult and costly to revert from (Path dependency). 
 The regulation impacts significant economic interests and matters of implication for 
(short term) profits. 
 The regulation in question affects redistribution rather than Pareto-efficiency.  
 The regulation in question is based on specific and quantified rules. 
 
3. Based on the case of Solvency II, the theory of multilevel governance is more likely to 
have explanatory power under the following circumstances: 
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 The long term national interests are hidden, or at least not pressing. In such cases 
current state executives are more willing to transfer sovereignty to supranational 
institutions.  
 The regulations in question affect entities that operate across (European) borders. 
 The interests related to, and consequences of, the regulation in question is evenly 
distributed between Member States.  
 The successful regulation of a specific field or industry requires significant 
information and/or expertise which is kept only by non-governmental actors. 
 
In chapter 5 of this paper, it was noted that absolute generalizations are not to be expected 
from intricate studies such as this one. Rather, as is common for case studies, the aim is to 
make contingent or typological generalizations which mean that the scope, or domain, of the 
generalization must be clearly specified. To what range of institutional settings, cultural 
contexts, time periods, geographic settings and situational contexts do the findings apply? 
(George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 119-120). Although such considerations go beyond the scope 
of this study, this is left as a warning and reminder that the inferences made about will not 
necessarily be true for the given theories if applied to case studies significantly different from 
the topic of Solvency II.  
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9 Conclusion 
 
The Solvency II project has been in the making for 15 years, spanning through a period of 
significant financial turmoil and the political reform of the Lisbon Treaty. It is clear that the 
legislative and political process that has led to a pan-European regulatory regime for the 
European insurance industry has not been left unaffected by these changes.  
Even without such shocks to the political process no single theoretical perspective could have 
explained the entire legislative process of a directive with the scope of Solvency II. The 
Lamfalussy process under which it was produced implies that the knowledge-based theory of 
epistemic communities have explanatory power for the development phase whereas the 
theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is a more suitable approach for the Council working 
group and the trialogue. In addition, given the complexity of the insurance industry, and the 
countless number of actors affected, the multilevel governance approach is relevant, 
particularly for explaining the involvement of the stakeholders representing the industry. This 
is indeed supported by the evidence in this study.  
However, the shocks mentioned above caused other breaking points and distinctions that 
were less predictable. The Lisbon treaty made the EU look more like a distinct political 
system than an international organization, especially through the enhanced powers obtained 
by the EP. Furthermore, the financial crisis created a sense of urgency in establishing the new 
insurance regulations, leading to the establishment of EIOPA. However, it also changed the 
solidity of European economies and brought to life the differences and path dependencies of 
the European life insurance industries. As a consequence, the necessary political 
compromises were made harder to achieve. Indeed, at the end of the process, the great power 
interests were brought to the top of the agenda, demonstrating that EU integration is still 
subject to the self-interests of state executives. 
 
In sum, as a consequence of the impact of these national interests, even if Solvency II 
functions according to the intentions, it will most likely take decades until European 
insurance regulation can be said to be fully harmonized. One reason is the traditional 
measures which are planned to last at least until 2032. Another is the significant variations 
that exist across Europe: Both in the nature of the national insurance markets and in terms of 
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supervisory traditions. New legislation can of course not change this overnight. However, it 
has induced the beginning of a process towards a united and equal European insurance 
market in which customers and companies face the same requirements and expectations 
regardless of nation state.  
It is yet to be seen how prudent the regulatory regime will turn out in the end. The LTGA 
measures essentially assume that the current markets are wrong and that the current long-term 
interest level is too low. The measures will most likely reduce the probability of companies 
leaving the market in the short run. However, it also allows many European companies, 
particularly in the large Western European countries, to reduce the level of reserves otherwise 
required. If interest rates do in fact stay low for years and decades to come this might become 
a problem as the Solvency II regime may, in some important areas, turn out to be 
insufficiently prudent. Nonetheless, analyzing and monitoring the risk that such an outcome 
might arise is just what Solvency II – unlike Solvency I - has been designed to do. Hence, 
there is little reason to doubt that Solvency II in the end is a significant and necessary 
improvement of the regulatory regime for the European insurance companies. 
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Appendix: Interview guide 
The questions in the following interview guide were the basis for interviews conducted in this 
study. However, as is common practice in semi-structured interviews, it is not necessarily the 
case that (all) the questions were asked (in the order stated). Rather, adaptions were made 
depending on the position, nationality, role, experience of the interviewee, as well as on the 
answers given to preceding questions. All questions were not necessarily relevant for every 
interviewee. The questions were split into five groups as follows. 
 
Group 1: Introduction and identification of the role and experience of the interviewee  
1. What is the basis of your personal participation and activities in relation to the 
Solvency II process?  
 During which periods have you been involved? 
 What is the scope of your involvement?  
 What has been the most relevant questions and issues in relation to your 
participation?  
 Given that you have participated in committees/expert groups etc. Has 
your mandate been to participate freely based on your own expert 
judgment; or have you had (political) instructions from your authorities. 
 What was your impression of the previous point when it came to 
participants from other nations? 
2. Who were the most influential actors in the process based on your personal 
involvement and participation in the process?  
 
Group 2: The Solvency II process in general 
1. Describe your general impression of the Solvency II process (not necessarily solely 
based on your personal participation in the process)? 
2. Which arenas (formal or informal) have been most important for progress and delays 
during the Solvens II prosessen?  
3. Which time periods have been most important/intense? 
4. What actors have been most important in shaping and developing the process? Has 
there been specific participants of particular importance? 
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Group 3: Core debates and issues in the Solvens II-process 
1. Which actors (countries, interest organizations etc.) have most strongly attempted to, 
or succeeded in, affecting the process? Have these actors operated domestically or 
directly in the EU process?  
2. What are the main reasons for the delays of Solvency II? Has there been many smaller 
issues or rather some few main problems?  
3. Between which actors has there mainly been disagreements? National interests 
(whether FSA‟s or on the political level); Internally in the EU; Interest 
organisazations; Individuals).  
4. What has been the main reasons for disagreements between these parties? Has it been 
related to technical issues or something else?  
5. Two important issues have been the issue of Long Term Guarantees for Life insurers, 
and the question of equivalence for the regulatory regimes of non-EU states. Between 
who, and in relation to what specific issues, has there been disagreements in relation 
to these questions? 
  
Group 4: Theory 
Different theories may give different answers to what drives and affects the process and the 
outcome of specific political processes. A potential distinction can be made between the 
following explanatory models:  
i. The political process has been driven by idealistic experts that are seeking to 
achieve a (Pareto)-optimal aim.  
ii. The political process has been driven by the participating actors seeking to attain 
their aims based on special interests..  
1. Do you have an opinion – preferably based on examples – on the extent to which 
these perspectives were present during important phases of the Solvency II process?  
2. Are there, in your opinion, other theoretical perspecives that could explain the 
process?  
 
Group 5: Ending 
1. Is there anything you would like to add? 
2. Can you recommend other interviewees? 
